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"A reason for the partial submergence of the economic
motive in the effective publicity on internation&l relations is

probabJ~

to be found jn the less perfect recep-

t.i vity of the public to the drab details of wi_de corrmercial
movements as contrasted witt its eagerness and capacity to
gbsorb accolmts of the seemingly simple and heroic acts of
great men. Biogr£pr'J is admi ttedl'y

fasc~_nat i

ng. Certain

types of publicists have for this reason come todescribe
history as

somet~'ng

of a dramA in which the fate of na-

tions is determ:1ned by the decisions of outstanding
statesmen Who, for all that is said to the contrary, may
have derived their ligbt from their inner consciousnesses.
But, except in the new biography, heroes

~re

philanthropic,

idealistic, and humanitarian. They II1re not influenced by
thoughts of mere gain. Hence, when we describe the acts of
nfil.tions 1n terms of the deeds of famous indi viduals, the
economic motive is often thrust unconsciously into the
background.
"The euphemist who overlooks economic realities is a
poor pedagogue for he explains events in terms of a
fictious causation. On the other hand, one sLould not become doctrinaire on the subject of the economic determination of national policies. There are many different
kinds of reasons for action. There are often

po~erful

psychological forces, springing from other than economic
causes, which bear dovm upon foreign offices and state depll1rtments and persull1de or coerce them into decisions. The
function of the scholar is to sift what evidence he has
c'

3

and to determine the motives as best he can with an unswerving

loy~lty

to the ideel of Truth."*

* B.H.',Hlliams l1Economic Foreign Policy of the

u.r,.11

p@~s.

2,3,7
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Introduction
t

,

If we look brief) y at the h1 story of Germany we see
that fjfty years before the
of small unorganized stetes.

~orld ~ar

\";1 th

she was onJy a mass

t"he coming of Bismarck

occured the unification of Germany into a Norld power of
highest

r~!TIk.

approlilching

B

'.:'hen the war began, Germany

Wlas

raf/idly

position of supl'emac), in Europe Bnd, in many

respects, a position of suprem&:cy in the '.'Iihole vior-Id. In
1914 Germliny

in tbe full tide of industrial !?TId cor.:mer-

WIiS

cial power. \Jut

of~be

half dozen prjncipal branches of

modern :'industrial production, she had achieved double or
more than double the output of England in iron and steel,
mac:hinery, electro-technic!?l products, and chemicals. She
1 ap:'ed onJ. y

j

n coal and in t e:xt ile production. her commer-

ci (;11 mercbant m9rine was rapidl y explmd1ng, the volume of
her foreign trade was exceeded only by that of Englsnd. The
United

~3t8tes

9]

one was clear] y aheldd of her in theciorld

industrial field, lmd had there been no war even tbe
Americsn supremacy might soon have been chsllanged.*
The Government of Germany, from tbe time of its unification, had been a monarchy. At the time of its near-supremacy, 'rdlhelm

'NlilS

tbe man in power. Bismarck bad m8de it

his policy to sep tbat tbe whole of }.urope

WfaS

a group of

monarcbies wlth Germany the strongest. If tlJis policy bad
been continued &fter his dismissal, Germany would to-dB_Y
probably be one of the world powers in more ways tban in
nliime.
J,~

Peter Reinhold - The Economic, Fin~ncial, and Folitical
State of Germany Since the War.
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The French have always been
Germans. rrhere is more than one

Q

direct contrbst to the

r;~son

for this stl;)tement.

The nati()nQ] cl-):;.ractEr of the French is for economic stab1lity and equilibrium

Wi

ich is considered sta.gnation by

the Germans. The French, as a whole a logical thinking
netion,
-\

th~nk

in terms of the past, wbile the Germans,

aspiring and ambiticus, think in terms of thf'l future, no
mattpr tow obscure and uncertain it rna, seem.*
1i:ith these facts in view
was ready when the

1~;ar

'NO

cliln re9dily see why France

bet:8n. It is hardly logical to fix

bere trle blame of t:he '/iar on either of these countries or
any other country. he vertbeless, when it came about, France,
according to her age-old policy of economic security, was
fulJy prepared, having

~lmost

given up her place in the

industria) and commercial world by the ever-increasing
rate of her rivals. In fact, the position of France in
comr(;erce at the beginnlng of tbe war was unique. In the
first pIece, most of the popuJation of France was engaged
in agriculture, thus making France less dependent on trede
for livelihood. In the second place, the

c~aractpr

of the

Prench industries made her also independent as to competition with other countries. Her

ind~stries

consisted mainly

of the luxury, art, and fashion t;ype, thus differing from
Germany and all other countries • The above obl ip:ed France to
import all tbe necessi ties such as macr,1nery, cotton, iron,
and

co~l.

AI] these made up the conditicns before tbe war.

Tf'_e tariff questicn before the -';'·ar was very interesting.
France had a poJ icy of protE;ction tLat vvas constantl,
K.

p

Kalant~rian

- The German Economic Policy

----------------------~

8

cbangjng from strict protection to almost free trade,
according to the whjm of the 001itical group in power or
of the economic condition of the country. Germany

ma~n-

tained a pol icy of protection in :aJ 1 those channels -Nbere
it seemed plGusible. You will recall that the unification
of Germany was not only built on the tariff but was also
made possible by it.
The colonial policy of the two countries was the only
phase in which they seemed to be similar. Both were for
gaining as many colonies and as much territory as they
could in other coUntries and for bu-Dding up, to the best
of their abilities, their respective relations on as many
as possible points on the globe.
In respect to the merchant marine of the two countries,
Germany was

b~y

fliir the superior. France unsuccessfully

tried to increase the number of ber own merchant srips by
a system of bounties.
One other factor to remember before turnlng to the
Treaty of VersailJes is that at the close of the FrancoGerman ;\ar in 1870, when France was defeated, the AlsaceLorraine territory was taken by Germany and annexed. This
strip of llmd was very valuable as will be seen] ater. Other
ob] igati ons were thrust i)_pon France by her eternal foe that
did not cause a feeling of subordination but rather one of
revenge wili ch we see agBin at the 'llreaty of Versailles.

---------------_.*

•....

_._

0\:-

.. --- -----_._-----'--

Charles F. Horne, editor - The Great EV6nts by Famous
Historians
Vol. 18
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Chapter 1
From Compeigne to Paris
On November the 11th the Armistice was signed bj
Germany. rrhe fight ing of the V.orld Y:ar was brought to a
c]ose. All

the nations ttat had participated were in the

ttroes of eXhaustion. Germany and Frf'nce were probably the
most hard hit of the major nations. These two were wrecked
--socis.lly, economi c f;ll

'j,

fj mmc iall y, and commerci ally.

Most of the fighting bad been on French territory and
9.1] of this llimd bad been literally

deVGst~.ted.

of soldiers lost by Frf'nce while fighting

The number

1,385,000;

Wll.S

40,000 civilianslNere slain; and the number of soldiers and
civilis.ns wounded was 3,000,000. The total population of
France Bt this time was 40,000,000. The cost of her property destroyed WBS valued at
debt

\I'I:'S

ir1Cr'eased f rom

~6

~lO,OOO,OCO,OOO.

The national

blllions in 1913 to

~~30

billions

in 1918. The net financial loss of France has been estimated at

~24

billions.

But before

~';e

go on '.v:ith

tr~e

story, it is fitting to

go back and look at the ';';Qr in its last stages, leading lJP
to the Armtstice.
On the 8th of January 1918, "oodrow ';ilson proclaimed
his famous "Fourteen roints"~} Up to this time Germl,my had
been making steady lH',advlay to victory. 'rhe >!estern Pront
had been pushed forward Bt;ain Rnd

at:a~n.

United States, bringing an end to the

Then came the

GE:rm~n

ing a. world crisis and, £8 a re8ul t of

t~ j

8

advance, bring1

a.ttar, bring-

ing anarchy. The United St5te8 proclaimed the principle of
justice to all fighting people. They supported democracy
~:-

Cooke ~nd ~:tickney, edi tors - Re.d1 ngs
nitional Rel~tions - page 546

j

n }uroJ;)el1n Inter-

10

and opposed Hn&rchy. The Allied powers immediately &dopted
the American prj nciple land the ":F'ourteen Points".
The first treaty m&de by opponents in the war was between Russia and Germany. (Rouman1a h8d signed a treaty but
tba.t was a minor country.) The Germans, who had

IiI.

few weeks

before heralded the American principles along with the
J\llied PO':'iers in +;11e hopes of vdnning over t'ne United States,
broke down and allowed the old methods of trE;aty making to
hold. They tViisted the IIFourteen Points" around until they
were 001 e to s ~.t i sfy all their .v ant s. 'rhey, figura ti vel y,
divided

HU8Si~

and put her in

Sle}-)

a position that tbe

AIJies could no longer count on her even as a "benevolent
neutral". Their triumpb over Russia so much encouraged the
Germlilns tbat they still drelilmed of being the leaders of
the world. The peace with Russia was cglled the "peace
wittout annexations". This treat J on the part of Germany
1

cOr"'!pJ ete] y won over the Am(-;ric~ms. ':11son said, "Force and
conquest, massacre and desol <.: t ion, such a s the 'iVorld llad
not known throu['h all the centuries of mod8rn civilization,
against

th~s

was to be pictured the great f1nal drama of

battle in ttle "jpst" .~:.

The great German gen0ral, Ludendorff,

had made aJ1 his plans. Four defjnite assaults were to be
made on the line. tach had been carefully planned and no
force had been omitted. 'fhe Itst ounce of strength

',nBS

to

be used. No reserve was saved in case of loss. It was the
plan of the leadArs thgt if this f!'iled, there would be no
use in further c8rrying on the

'~,ar.

It hard1y seems possible

~~C.F. Horne-edi tor"Tbe Great Events of the Great '11'Qrll

Vo]. 6

pg.a.f

11

that human beings could have plotted out such a massacre.
The first of this series of "Kaiser Battles" began at
Pic2rdy. An attempt

'NSS

Yl1l"lde to break the I lne at the point

of British defense. This was the heaviest day of fight:lng
of the 'jar. The British succeeded in hold:ing the line and
the first of the "KBiser Battles" was a failure.
The second battle was that of Lys on April 9,1918.
The Br:i.tish were again attacked by the combined forces of
the Germans Bnd their a}' ies in an attempt to cut off the
British from the other Allies. This battle was almost a
success for the Germans. The British line was broken and
muct ground was lost before the retreat could be stopped.
The third battle was thet of Aisne. This point was
closer to 1)a1'is Bnd the F'rench troopsbroke their line and
retreated. 'rhe Germans covered the ground rapidly and got
within 40 miles of the French capitol before they were
stopped. The Americans c:;;me to t11e rescue and the third
great battle ended in failure.
The last project of Ludendorff vias ctilled the "Peace
Battle". He cRlled upon every reserve that remained, knowing that unless this battle W,"Si,on all 'Nould be lost. A
terrific drive was started on the 15th of JuJy. This ended
in defeat for the Germans.
General Foch, commander of the Allied Nations' army,
now began bis counter attack wbich lasted until the 8th of
November when the

Ger'11~lDS

requested terms. Tbe German army

officials are reported to have /asked for peace terms from

12

their government long before. They realized the disastrous
resul ts that i1\fould follow, but the men in power failed to
see anyUl:ing in thi s lip:ht. 'ftey

S8';;

hope for a

gr~ater

Germany in the dlm obscurity. hlthough these men failed to
see defeat in tIle great project of Ludendorff, the mut1ny
of the German navy at Ydel caused tliem to realize tIle
futili ty of German success. l!.hen final1 y tc-'5rms ':!F're asked
for, the Kaiser and

~rince

Max abdicated, throwing the

government into chaos. This could not, however, have made
conditions any worse.
Probably the only assets not destroyed in Germany were
its natural resources and its national spirit. The economic
structure had, durlng the past four years, been converted
into a war machinery. Every possible resource had been
renov£ted to 1'i t the war needs. ThUS, 'when the 'fiar closed,
the economic s truc ture was compl eteT J' destro,; ed. 'fhe
foundstion of this pirantic structure wes German finance.
It was now in dire straits. All the securities, currency,
gold (practically &]1 of this had been exported),

~nd

savings had been wiped out.
signed
The terms of the Armistice at/Compeigne, November 11,
1918, were very indefinite Bnd caused the complete dovmfall
of Germany. They stated

tha~

the terms of a treaty would be

drawn up 'Nith the "Fourteen Points" of Vdlson as a basis.
This much was agrEeable to the defeated. But the additional
terms, such as the evacuation of all conquered territory,
the repatriation of all prisoners, the surrender of the entire fleet including all of the submarines, the surrender

p

1:3

of guns, aeroplanes, rolling stock, and arnmun5.tion, the
return of Alsace-Lorraine, withdrawal beyond the Rhine,
cancelling of the Treaties of Brest-litovsk Bnd Bucharest,*
and, to complete the list, the full responsibility of
causing the war, were very disQgreesble and humiliating to
Germany.

*

*~~

The Treaty

of Brest-litovsk was signed by Russia on the

one hand end the Centra] Power& on the other on March :3, 1918.
Its terms were equsl to the unconditional surrender of Russia.
The Treaty of Bucharest was signed by ROQmania and the
Central Powers on December 5,1917.
These tVJo treaties imposed upon Roumania and Russia
extreme mes.surps 2nd huge los ses of terri tory. They were
later pojnted out at Paris as showing the violent and barbarous war alms of Germany.

**

t

The Armistice - signed November 11,1918 at Compei§;ne
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Chapter II
The Mechanism of the Conference ,""nd Wilson's Covenant
Now that the fighting had stopped, the Peace Conference
was cAlled to meet at Paris for making the peace terms of
the Armistice definite. All the Allies were to meet and
make their declarations, grievances, and c19ims. At the
time of tbe Armistice the people of all the countries were
for world peace, the 1);ilsonian policy of settling the terms
of the Peace, and the outlawing of war. After a month or so,
however, this glitter of the war days wore off.

"As the

call for love and service to mankind grew less intense,
the voice of self-service and self-love grew strong again.
Few men have such broad vision that they C8n see earth as
a whole or can realize all the influence of that which

happens far in the East upon him who dwells,perchance, in
the farthest

~est.

In the months that followed the Armistice,

thE' U,ouf'hts of ,,"acn ordinary m&n centered more upon his
own nation, his own nei€;hborhood, his
comfort. "-l~

ONn

family, his own

Ea.ch nation in turn viewed the si tU9tion from

its own national viewpoint. By the time of the Peace Conference the complete reaction had come. Most of the nations
brought definite plans for the natiunal security of itself.
'l'he) all seemed to f2vor tl1e destroying of the defeated or,
a.t least,

th~7economic crippling so that no feET of tbem

would be possible in the future.

*

CJF.Horne -The Gre'""t Events of the Gre'""t
pg.14

War .••. Vol. 7
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The Conference met in JGnuary, 1920. The Supreme
Council, constituted at the first mefOting, was composed of
the two ranking

deleg~tes

of each of the Five Great Powers,

Great Britain, France, It sly, Japan, and the United States.
This group, "the Council of Ten,"

~s

it was often called,

p.:radually superceded by first "t"he Big Five", and later,
"the Big Four" composed of 1(,il son, C] emenceau, Lloyd George,
and Orl ando, carried on the ma.in ':Iork of the conference.
This was tlie

f~lling

point of the Conference. Four men

literally remade Europe. "'The Big Four' who dominated the
Versailles Peace Treaty, were not economists. They probably
gave little consideration to the trade balance of the
various countries. M. C1emenceau, reflecting the views of
the Frencb people who bad been bled 'ifhi te in every way,
thought first, last, Bnd al'jJB.ys of the permanent security
and of the maximum possible indemnity to help repair
damage-----and to cripple Germany. ,,~:.

The French people

fel t that they had been overwhelmed durj.ng the War of 1870,
and subsequently paid an indemnity to Germany of one bn 1 ion
dollars, 'hich for those days seemed a fantastic sum, besides giving up two of their best provlnces, Alsace and
Lorrej ne. 'l'hen the ,. orld "ar had been brc)urr,t home to every
French family

b~

wa~

of death or of the maiming of one or

more of its members. It affected them still more because it
had been fougbt entirely on French soil. Consequently, one
of tl·c

cornerB~onps

of

~he

Treaty was mapped out by France

-l:-F.J .Lisman-- lI This Unbalsnced 'j,orld" --Barron' s

p

\~eekly

Oct.26
1931
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as beinE:

fa

guarsnty on the pB_rt of .bngl find and the Uni.ted

States agajnst furtller 9.ttacks on France by Germany. The
views of Clemenceau ere regarded as tbe most biased of s.ll
the nstions represented, but it cennot be forgotten that
they were :illso +:he lrost powerful. Orlando, the Italian
delegate, was a man that repres(mted his country also, and
his ideas of "

tre~ty

were mUC!1 tbe S2me

IiIS

Clemenceau's.

Lloyd George, on the other hand, was at tbe be£innirg of tb.e
Conference inc] ined to follow \]'jilson, who was the only one
at the Conference that seemed to have any idea as to the
magnitude Bnd the size of the undertaking. Lloyd George
bowever, forced to ab8ndon this idea as his term of

:H3S,

office as peace delegate to Paris expired while the Conference was still going on. In order to be reelected, he was
forced to adopt a platform of tlHe.ng the Klili s er ll and "rhake
the Germans pay sliil] tnt

for shillirig" • "hen be retll.rned to

tre Conference, his infI uence could no longf,r be 'lsed to
~r.

furtLcr
Lr.

iIson's

ide~ls.

'ils<Qm insisted that the first point to be taken

up be that of the Covenant of the League of Nations. he
had

8

definite plan for this League which he presented to

the IlBig Four". The;; were forced to discuss it first because of the dominant posj tion held bJi Mr. val son. The
United States was the least effected by the

~ar.

They were

about the only country in theforld that had food and money,
and all the other nations were dependant on these. Mr.
~I:ilson

adopted the principle of ebstina_cy and the other

17

nations were forced to agree with him because of this independent pos1tion of the Un1ted
League was thus made an
The leading
Nations were:

~tates.

inte~ral

f~atures

The Covenant of the

part of the general treaty.

of the Covenant of the League of

The two leading institutions of the League

were the l\ssembl J and the Council. The Assembly

WIaS

the

general body in which all ststes which are members of the
League, are represented. in the Assembly, each state was
equal to every other state and casts a single vote. The
Council

WG.S

Iii

smaller and fer more important body. As

sketched in 1919, itv9s to be composed of five permanent
members, one each from the United States, Great Britain,
France, Italy, and Japan, together with four members elected annually by tbe Assembl,P, that is, nine in all. To the
C01IDCil which meets normally four times a year and .·ifdch
can be summoned, in addi tion, in nn:.' press1ng emergency,
import~mt

functions were a;::signed. In the first place, it

must at once act

8S

a body of concilators the moment a

dispute which threatens war arises. As peace is its great
concern, it is authorized to formulate l-ilrims for the reduction of armamnn ts • .it must also atti;mpt to abate tlle
evils wbJch have arisen from trle private [nd competiU.ve
manufacture of guns and munitions. A very serious responsibili ty fell upon it in connection wi th the sy stem of
Under this system, the colonies taken from Germans,

mand~tes.
liS

well

as many of the pro vinces appropri.ated from Turkey, were not
considered to be the property of the powers to which they
werf: assigned, but possessions lield in trust for the League,

18

to which an Qnnual report of their &.dministrliltion is

due.~~

;ith the Coven&nt C8mc the secret sessions of the
"Big Four". It had been pr0cl&ilimed before the Armistice
th&t all the methods of "old diplorr.lilc-y" would be done sway
with.·~·~~

'fhe "Big· Four 1l h&d 145

sf:~ssions

lOS

comp&ilred with

111 held by al J the rest of the groups. 'llbese meetings of
the Bi£ Four were beJd in secret behind locked doors, with
no one eJse present.

~h&t

w~s

the re&ilson for all this

secrecy and methods of old diplomecy? The intentions of
these men were good but they failed to c&rr, them out, or
perL£ps t.hey were not based on the

ri~:ht

grounds. Tbe reason

was p&ilrtly the tress. The opinion of the Big Four on tbis
is expres sed by th e v:ords of Lloyd George. He sa.id,
th~

11

If

Press int 0 rvenes in the early stages of the negotations,

it will crystallize opinions :and agreement will be rr&ilde
more diffi cult. \I A
this

'!f~.S

un~nimi ty

of votes 'Nas necess2r:y and

t.hought to be impossible if the Press

Wfil.S

allowed

an open hand. Politics 1i'.'ould be brought into pl&ilY r-long
with the Press. A very tr&ilGic incident of the Press h&.d
&lread, caused a difference of opinion :in France, and this
exper:tence along with t}le a.bove nsrned re&son caused the
Press to be wittilield.
In msking the Pe&ilce, it was deemed a matter of first
importance to make impossible a reviv&ill of the Teuton
agfressive spirit aga 4 nst France, because the territorial
cessions and the repsrations dem&nds of France would
-I:. ScheiTill
~<*

The History of Europe--pg. 744
Wilson l sl1Fourteen .toints"
Point One -- 1I 0pen covenants of peace openly ,a.rri v~d
at ....• "
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naturalJy cause the German peoplf: to

seel~

future opportunity

to be revenged. '"ith a population almost, if not quite,
doub] e that of the Prench Republic, Gerr.umy would be a constsnt menQce to the nation which had suffFlred so terribly
in the past by reason of the imperislistic spirit prevalent
:in the German Empire. The fear of this menace strongly influenc~d

the French policies dur:ing the neEotQtions at Paris.

In fact, it was hard to 8void the feeling that this fear
dominated the conduct of the French delegates and the attitude of tbe!r Government. They demanded much, and, recognizing the prob9"ble effect of their demands on tbe German
people, SOUgl1t to

obt~in

special protection in case their

vanquished enemy attempted in the future to dispossess them
b-y force of UP, ] lind which they had been compelled to surrender or attempt to make them restore the indemnity paid.
The aggenda of the Treaty ryas; The Covenant, the
boundaries of German-y, Ger!T1sn-y outside of Furope,
2nd reparations, finEncial Bnd

econo~ic

arm~nents

c1Buses and other

miscellaneous clauses.
In this first IHilrt, the League Covenant"; the League of
Nations was

pl~nned

out in its every

det~il,

before mentioned. It '."as "'lr. 'tiJ son's idea
an =nte t T2l part of U e 'l'rr

~"t;y

~nd

as

U18+;

tas been
it be tnade

Ccn:'8nJi .has on1 y ldm to

thBnk bec9use he held out against the entire Conference for
its prjnciples and even on one occasion threatened to leRve
the Conference on this account. The European people, however, misunderstood the Covenant in that they took it to

*
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mean that "America had entered the V,:ar, and tbat Mr. Wilson
had come to Paris as final proof that the people of the
United States would unhesita.tine;ly consent to bear all the
burdens, run

~ll

the risks, accept all the difficulties,

i nc1dent to perpetual intermixtures in l1:uropean affairs.
"At the moment when the Treaty of Versailles was being
made, all the European Allied peoples were demanding
passionately, 1ncessBntly, unreservedJy, the

r~alization

of

all their material claims. Yet all took it as a foregone
conclusion tlu.t the peop1 e of the United States, who had
resigned all title Bnd interest in the fruits of the common
victory, would be s (ltisfied to accept a contract, by wl',ich
Europe subscribed, with reservations, to the vaguest sort
of moral princiy1cs, while the United
most specific
It

~as

~nd

~tates

undertook the

far-reachirg material responsibilities."*

on this account that tte peoples of

~urope

made

such a strenuous obj Bction to the 'rreaty after the Ameri.can
Congress refused to ratify it, because the Allied statesmen
constructed their sett1empnt with Germany on the grounds
tbat such would be the interpretation of the future relation
of the United States with Europe.
!lIn 19J 9, the :-natf'rial int0rests of the Europe8n visitors
and the moral enthusiasm of the American President, comb:!ned
to tlHilke the bBsic priIlcip1e of the l'eBce

~"ett1ement. "~H:-

This moral enthusiasm of tt:e President was expressed when
he said tLat the general plsn of tbe League was;(l) That it

.r,.

Frank H.

-iH~ Frank H.

~,immonds

~imlronds

"How .burope Made f 8ace \;lthout America"p. 28
Lurope Keep the Peace II p .11
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should be strong enough to prevent

Q

future RttQck upon

nations; (2) To make the world s:.fe for democracy; (3) To
remove in a

me~.sure

the immediate causes of war; (4) To

provide peaceable meRns of
promote
nRt~onal

closer

Ii

friends~ip

settle~ent

of disputes; (5) To

of nations; (6) To

~ave

an inter-

union ags 1 nst war; &nd last, to organize the world.

Whether or not all thAse principles hRve been cgrricd out
i.n t.be JenEue Covenant is left to the individual opinion, but
I beJieve that it can be truthfully said that the President
did rll in his povrer t.o embody the above in tt.e Covenant.
The figl'it that the .President had to put up for the Covenant
was :,olrr!ost superruman, but it was included in Ule fiLQl
Treaty.
To have some idea of the repelling forces, let us look
at the policy of t;Le French. "The important fact is that
the settlements in favor of France under the Treaty were of
a nRture which made the cc:ntinuance of peace between

t~te

two natjons doubtfnl if Germany possessed the abiJ i ty to
re£8jn her

m1]it~ry

strength and if nothing was done to pre-

vF:nt l1er from usj ne!' it. Under these circumst ~lDces, a
special protective treaty seemed

fl

prf<ctic['] way to check

the conversion of the revengeful spirit of the Germans into
another war of InvGsion."*
There were also two other clauses of the Covenant
that the French opposed. '1'he first is quoted;

"The members

of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of nstional fJrmaments to the lowest

o):·Robert I ans1ng

p

"The Pea.ce Nef'otations ll

pg. 185
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point consistent 'fiith the nation ..] safety

~md

the enforce-

ment by common action of international obligations.
liTtle Council, taking account of the geograpYdcsl situntion and circumstsnce of each [;,tate, shall formulste
plans for such reduction for the consideration and action
of trle several Governments. ".::The otter clause opposed by the French was that. which
proposed that the colonial possessions of the Central Powers
be viven over as Mandstes to the supervision of the League.
It read;

liThe best. method of giving practicaJ effect to

this pr1nciple is th&t the tutelage of such people sbould
be entrusted to advanced nations, who by reason of their
resources, their experience, or their geoe:rsphical posi tion
can best undertake this responsi bili ty, and vt:ho are \l/il1 ing
to accept it, and that this tutelage shou],d be exercised
by them as Mandl'!tories on behalf of the League. IIJ':_-;;_

*
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Chapter III
The Boundpries of Germany
The second part of the Treaty, however, seemed to
quiet the French oppositiGn mentioned above as the boundaries
of the New

Germ~ny

accomp~ingmap,

were made. As

c~n

be readily seen on the

Germany lost much to France. First, let us

look at the SaHr Basin. This

w~s

a small tract of land

(738 square m' les) betvleen the bound2ries of Germany and
France. It belonged to Germany, but the French asked for
outright annexation of it at the Conference because of the
German destruction of French mines during the War at Lens,
Valenciennes, and other places. This Basin is ver;y importm t
because of its coal fields. Before the war it produced 18
million tons of coal Rnnu9Jly. This section was almost complete] y German in population. 'rhe conference refused France
the right of annexation but a compromise was made, the terms
being:--The Saar Blilsjn was to be detacheo. from

G"rm~ny

and

a separate state was to be created, with the League as a
guj ding hand. The government was to consi st of five men, one
from France, one local, and three neither French nor German.
These were to be appointed by the League yearly. The ownerto
stip of the m4nes was to go the French. In 15 years after

1920, a plebiscite was to be heJd in this area and this would
determj.ne the government--whether .B'rench, German, or a
continuation of the autonomous rule of the League. But
if tte paebisci te went back in f'tvor of tbe Germans, the
Germans would be forced to buy the mines outright from the
Frencll with gold.
Next clil.me the decj_sion

a;lAl sace-Lorraine.

Thi s is a1so

"

BEL&/UM ~

!VCE

,.

,

,
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indicQted on tbe mGp. rrovision for the return of this
~t

territory wr;;s written in tbe j!,rmistice.

re~d:

"The

territories which iere ceded to Germany in accordance with
the preliminaries of

~eace

signed at

Vers~illes

on February

26,1871, and tbe Treaty of Frankfort of lVla)' 10,1871, are

restored to French sovereignty
I~rmistice

of

l~ovember

import~nt

2S

an industrial

from the dEte of the

8S

11, 1918."~~nd

Als~-ce-Lorraine

is very

a mining center. It is &bout

the size of Connecticut and Vermont (5,695 square miles).
Its population at the present is

~bout

1,795,000. It is

importlOmt for tbree reasons: (1) At fechelbraun is the only
important oil well in Germany; (2) Its rich potash mines;
and (3) The

Lorr~ine

iren fields. In 1913, these fields

produced 21,000,000 tons of iron. "In spite of 911 th:;.t
has been written about the supposed affinities and desires
of the population of j,lsace-Lorraine, it must not be forgotten
vit~lly

U:~t

tte n"tionfill interests of Germl<ny

~nd

France sre

concerned in its possession, not merely in the

general sense of +;he deslrf: to keep or to recover something
which has been

fou~ht

over as " matter of national honor,

but in the very definite respects of m"ll i tary
lOnd economic power. And t}lere
con~iderations

}r',ave

advl'<nt~,ge

been times when tYese

were put nakedly in the foregrcund as the

dominant moti ves. "~H~

The sovereignty of this territory

has been the subj ect of controversy for mlOny

dec~.des

in

Europe. The most propounded argument is th&t it whould be

i:-

'l'he P.rmi stice at Compeigne
Lord and Raskins--

~;ome

j\rticle 51
.t'roblems of the reace Con1"erence
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governed by thRt country which has the

l~rgest

percentage

of its nfitive citizens in the province. This ethn.lof:'ical
argument 'Nas broken down by t1',e

f~.ct

Austria Rnd Switzer]snd both had the

tliet the countries,
l~rger

percentage of

German-speaking: people, yet they remHined independent. The
argument whicl).'lon out in the Conference was tllat of nationbound~ries

91 sBf.::>ty. "International

m&.y be drawn along

ethnic, economic, geographic, bistoric, or str8tegic lines.
6ne or all of these elements m8Y influence the deCiSion,
but'!hetever argument may be urged in favor of anyone of
these,

th"~

chief obj ect in the determinfltion of the

sovereignty to be exercised

of

Q

~jthin

Q

certain territory is

nstion as self-pres0rvption is jn the life of an 1ndi-

vidu:z.l. It

j

s even more so,

the impulse of se]
Alsflce-Iorrgine

8

s nat ions do not respoy,d to

f-sRcrifice."~~

WGS

aJmos

L

1ience, the fact tlH,t

dghty-five percent GerroBn-

speaking in 19JO did not effect the terms of the TrQsty.
The next step t&ken in the Treaty
tle relr:tions of

Germ~my

'r;j

WBS

the fixing of·

th Austri 2. 'rhe 'rreaty read,

"Germany acknowl (;df:es I;;nd \: ill Y'espect strictly the j.ndependence of rustris, with5n the frontiers which may be
fixed in a Trpsty between that

;~,tate

Bcd "-:h(3 Principal

Allied and Associated iowers; she agrees that this indeppndence shEll be inalienable, except with the consent of
the Counell of t:be Le8 cue of
included for i;he

~:-

**
p

nCfJ

l~ations .II~H:-

Czecho-tSJaiwon:i,a,tate,

Like terms were
fol~nd,

Lansing-- The ,pepce Ne~QtiltiQns-- Pg. 102
The Treaty of Versailles
Part 3
~ection 4
~--~.-------

RussiR,

.Article 80
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and tl1e new RussiiO.n Stat0s. By these terms F'rtilnce

Wfi,S

building up her policy of security. By these, she put
Germany in such " posjtion tb2t no secret ullisnces or
agreements of any kind couJd be made or in any

~ay

could

e unj on be made by ":hi ch Germany could join with any other
power against Prance.
FolJow1ng the sbove, we find the decision
boundary between Germ:;nJ7

~md

BS

to the

the new foland. 'rhe most im-

port ant concession of the eastern

bound~ry

of Germ&ny was

that of Upper '::11esia. This territory ',las extraordinariJy
ricl1 in minersls and import ant industri ~llly. For example,
just before thelilr, its

COGI

production ,,y,"s 44,000,000

tons yearly-- three times ss great as that of the Saar
Basin and 23% of Germlilnyls total output of coal. It furnished 34% of her production of l~&d ore; and 81% of her zinc.
"'l'he loss of so immensely viO.luabl e
8

F

terri tory would mean

severe bJow to the economic life as well as to the pride

of the

'~~erm ~n

f2ir] y

dem~lllded

Upper

~ilesia.

peopl e. It

(![J.B

a s Bcrif ice thFt cou] d be

only if tIle lrE'jori ty of th-=-' popu] ::otion in

desired unj on ,'it th

!~oland.

As to the wishes

of the population, tLe evidence was strongly in f:;ovor of
Polish claims, but it was not absolutely conclusive. lience,
the Conference finally resolved th&t in so gr&ve a matter
the decision must be left in

t}-f)

tnemsel ves by plebiscite. II~~

There were ,"Iso three other

provinces left to

B

hands of the people

plebiscite in this iO.rea; Terchen, ArvQ,

and Bzepes (Zips). This decision of the e&stern boundary
re1ates to the topic for two reasons: first, because

*
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lit~rally

wes responsible for the decision and second, be-

cause it 'flaS one of the

found~·tions

of the }'rench pol icy.

The French were interested in this territory
wished to see it joined to the hew 1"0] and.
'!!88

bec~use

Anot~er

they

point

thr;t the sepBratlon of tbis imporbmt inining section

v!ould

furt.t~pr

cripvle the Germa.ns and sloV'! dO'Nn their

possibi1itles of ever usjng it again to the height of the
Great rowers.
Now

ca~e

the making of the new Poland. This esteblish-

mf'llt of Polgnd, or rather the reestabJ ishment, was the one
polnt in the Treaty that vIas

lID

bonest application of the

princ ipl es of the Fourteen l'olnts as ] aid d011\Tn by

i1 son

and on which the Treaty was supposed to have been built.
On the principle of tl'e reestabl isbment, all the Fowers
agreed, but tbis '!'las only the beginning. ',''chat were the
boundaries to be'? Poland had been era_sed from the map so
long that it remained only

l.<

name, a memory, or a cause

rather than a country. The

bound~lries

fjnalJ_y laid down

incJuded most of .east rrussia, ";,est IJrussia,

and the pro-

vince of Posen. At this deciSion, Germ:my could hardly
make anJ1 legitimate protest, but she did on the point that
France was only doinE this to place a 'buffer' state between her and Russia, in order to prevent any coalition.
A further development of this will be se':::n in the postW8_r years.
To get a view of the Polish opinion let us look at
the opening words of Ignace Paderewski's speech to the
Polish people. liThe .L-olish nation is to-day] i vjng through

F
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solemn moments. I suppose that in its eventful history there
INsa

never

9.

t:tme more solemn, more flOteful thQn the present.

The fQte of our country is at stake; powerful people holding in their hands the destiny of the world, &ire building
a

fr~mework

for our independent existence, we

decid~ng

the frontiers of our State, and soon wil] pronounce a final
sentence, from wbich, no doubt for long years, there will
be no

appe~l,

perlJ9ps for many generations. Violent bursts

of hope and of joy snd anxiety are strongly shaking our
nation::;] spirit. From ever) side, f rom every corner of our
former commonweal th, people are coming here to

~;',9rsaw

2nd

going there to raris, in frock coats Bnd smock frocks,
in old-fsshioned country dress, in

mount~ineer

costume,

and t', ey cr,'y aloud End implore tha t their dj.stant province
should be united to the 101 ish State. "-1~
Further tlHm tIlis the Polish na+,ion had been promised
a port on the Sea. The realization of this
tedious than i t

,~ra

w~s

far more

s expected. Danzig, was the 10gicBl port

to offer f'oland but this city at the mouth of tbe Vistula
hed

b,~en

buil t up by Germany and it was in truth

~

German

city. To give it over to the ioles was an open breach of
the Fourteen foints 8nd in entire oPPosition to the principles of the whole Conference. Another solution tothe
problem was sought. It was establishment of the Free City
of Danzig. By this, since the Conference could not give
Pol:ond liil.ccess to the selii on ethnigraphic grounds, it was
stated thet, "The Allied and Associated Powers undertake
to establish tbe town of Danzig, together with the rest of

~l-

Ignace Paderewski---nddress made in !,~rsaw in May, 1919
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the territory described in Article 100 (the narrow strip
of territory surrounding the city
of about

30~000),

a total population

as a Free Citi. It will be placed under

the protection of the League of NBtions. 1I~\tjme, tbe Allied

~md

At the same

Aflsociated Powers undertook to estab-

] ish a Treaty between the Fo1ish Government and the Free
Ci ty of Danzig which had the fo110vdng obj ects; (1)

'1'0

include the Free City of Danzig in the customs frontiers
of the 1"01 ish Government; (2) To ensure 1-01 and of the
free use of the Danzig port lil.nd waterways; (3) To give
Poland control of the
trol of the means of

railw~ys

in the City, Gnd 21so con-

cornmunic~tion;

(4) The right to im-

prove the above works; (5) To provide

0

gainst the des-

crimination of fo1ish citizens in the Free City; (6) To
manage the foreign relations of Danzig as well as the
diplomatic protection of the citizens abroad. To sum R]l
the above into the one phrase, Danzig was separated from
roland only technic91ly, but united v7ith her geographically and economically.
This discussion of F'oland CBnr:.ot be complete V'Jithout
the mention of the Corridor. frhis is the s trip of land thatconnects Poland mGjor with the Baltic Sea. This Corridor
separates Germany from ElOst i'russia. East Prussia is a
pure German province, 15,000 square miles in area with a
popul&tion of

2~

million. It is a marvellously tilled

territory which stands out jn contrast to the undeveloped

*
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territories of its neighbors. The

~oles

wished to

obt~in

p:.rt of th'is territory j.n order that they have complete
control of the shortest railwQy route from
They

to Danzig.

~arS8W

the right to :. plebiscite in the desired :.re:.

obt~ined

but their hopes were dashed b-y the large majority of Germsn
votes wh:ich reverted the territory to the Germans. The
Corridor, however, rem:.incd.

~he

sovereignty of this terri-

tory was derived on ethnographic grounds. It had

iii.

majority

neither Germ:.n nor folish, but was constituted mainly of
Laschubs, who are
alien peoples.

:.nd other isolated groups of

[~,l:.vic,

~ince

the

est~blishment

of the rolish sover-

eignty in the Corridor, the majority of Gprmans have left
and now it is predominantly Polish. fhe IDB1n objection of
Germany to this is the f:.ct that the Corridor separates
them from Fast

~russia.

These decisions concern'ing Polend

were careful J -y pl anned b-y the French. 'rhey s:.w in the
Poland an
making her

WIilS

ow

~IJ

y aglainst Germany. By buD ding up i)oland and

2S

strong as pOSSible, it insured the security

of France. By
Poland

j\j

g~dning

for Pol:.nd these vRluable concessions,

put under obligation to France. 1'11 these con-

cessions only increased the h:.tred of Germany for F'r:.nce
:.nd built up more and more the desire for revenge.
The bound:.ry between Germlil.ny Iilnd DenD1:.rk

WIilS

*
to be

determined lil.ccord"ng to the wishes of the population. By
thjs Germany lost little territory. As this does not concern the Frlilnco-Germliln action it will be passed over with
only the mentioning of it.
The next p&rt of the Treaty was the decision of
J,~

R.V,.V. TemperlY,editor - A Eistar}, of the ,['eljiCe Conference
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Heliogo1~nd.

the mouth of the
"~r

~

This was

as a very

~lbe

sm~11

island in the North Sea

~t

River that hed been used during the

import~nt

fortificliOtion. The fortifications,

mil i tary es tBb] i shmen ts,

~

nd 1 :ilrbors were to be d'3stroyed

by !}ermany and;rere not to be reconstructed in the future.
This destroyed rmy hope of Germany to ever end:mger 'J'iestern
Europe bJ' water.

to

LliOst came the decision as/Belgium. '.th1s is outstanding
because Belgium had been a neutral at the beginnIng of the
.,:ar and GermanJ' had forced her into tile '.,Jar. rrhe Belgiams
had fou£:bt side b:; side with the lllied ?owers. They had
suffered more than

~-my

other nation because of the German

occ'Lpation lasting almost during the entire Vhi•. r. \,nen the
1Nliir 'Nas ended, Belgium expected much in compensation. \';hen
the council of the 'lIen 'Nas called, Belgium was excluded,
likewise in the Council of Four. '11his

WfJ.S

not thei.r only

disappointment however, beclimse the:; expected a correctlon
in the boundary on the frontiers of holland and luxemburg,
two neutr91 countries vil,icb were not mc:mbcrs of the t'eace
Conference and consequently not subject to the jurisdiction
of it. The only

boundar~

correction that naS mAde was a

very small addition to Be1gium

on the German frontier.

According to the 'rrelilty, the Kreise, tiiR1medy, and .c,upen
were transferred to Belgium (376 square miles; 61,000 population) •

01:'

One matter affecting holland did, however, concern the
Conference, namely tbe

neutr~lity

of Belgium, which had

been compu1sor;y and guar:.nteed by three treaties -- one

*
p
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between the Five Great powers and Belgium, one between
these powers 8nd hOlT and, smd one between holland and Belgium (1839). Belgium thus

obt~dned ~.

hearing at tre Confer-

ence with the object "to free Belgium from that JimitRtion
on her sovereignty which w ~.s imposed on her by the treaties
of 1839, and, in the interest both of Belgium end of general peace, to remove the dangers of BelE:ium 8nd the disadvmtages arising from tt~e s=-id treaties." Belgium and Holland
were accordingl) invited to

appe~r

before the l"onference in

order to set forth their views wjth regard to auch a revision.
The Belgiums mBintuined that she had been 2.';i ven vlcak frontiers
in 1839 on the r:round that she was to be protected b:y the
Great Powers; such protection having failed disastrously
in 1914, she should be given frontiers which would enable
her to hold her own

~ith

her neighbors, in

~ar

snd in

pea.ce. Belgium arFued that the unlimited sovereignty 'uhich
had been promised her in rresident '.'il son t s seventh point
ought to c larry wi tb it the frontiers

tll~t

had been denied

her in the days of her weakness. holland had no objection
to the abandonment of Belgium t s

neutr~"J

it), which had been

guaranteed to her as well as to Belgium,
consider for

F

~ut

she would not

moment any concession of her own territory.

She declared, however, thlilt she WliilS re8dy to discuss amicably
wi tll Bel gium any adjustments of conditions of navig9t ion,
etc. A Commission was appointed and it set to work immedi:3.teJ y,
but when the Conference was ready to liil.dj ourn it had no report

~s

yet to make so Hol'End was successful in every way.

"If the tnrritorial stgtus of Belgium h.s not been essen-
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'ilOrE:E. No sllare in a prob} emRtic indemnity 'sill compensate
hRr for ber direct losses, not to spe:;;k of ber other expenses -- the stripping of her resources, the enforced
idleness of her factories, the

markets and ber t.rf)llsit trlilde."-l<gium to

rem~d

of her foreign

disappe~r~nce

A hero in 1914, is Bel-

n a crippl e for the future? 'l'he German is gone,

but he left; ru1n and disil 'usion bebind []jm. Belglum now
looks 8t t'[,e prosperous

Boll~nd,

th9t remaired neutral,

nnd

the Luxr:m"burg that succumbed, land wonders that in the future
wleich course she 'l,'ill follow. rrhere is 11 ttle doubt. For
t.he future, Belgium's security lies :i.n a strong League of
Nl!ftions

~d

jnlhat such

&

Belgium teak thp LeaGue as

Le&EUe st8nds for. r.t first,
p.

"mere scrap of t'apf:rll, but

now she reaJizes that cooperation with the League 1s the
best, since it

~as

the sense of internationel right that

brollght the world to Belf:ium'S side in the Great \',ar, and
th~t

it is in the broadening and deepening of
the chief hope lies in the future.
friend in Prance.

Fr~nce

up of Be] gi um she

',~ouJ

desired &1lie8

d have

tion to her. Bel giumNas

j:.~lso

Q

~mother

sense that

Belgium found a
~nd

by the building

country under obI iga-

very desir9bJ e

her intense hatred for GETmany. Another

f~ll

f~ct

y bec8use of

to be r0member-

ed is that Belgium separates FranCE: from Germany, thus
rnB_king Belgium too a 'buffer state'.

* H~skins &nd lord -- fome
** Goschen' s Report on his

~roblems of
] ~.st hours

the P8ace Conference
in
pg. 69
Berlin. Cooke and Stickney - Readings in Europe~n International Relations - Page 382
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Chapter IV
Germ~n Ri€~hts

~nd

Interests Outside of Germany

This section of the treaty was not so much
b J Frfmce

~8

it

W~

~dvoc~ted

s by ;:,ng} f:nd. By the treaty, however,

GermanYfI,"s forced to renounce

~l

her rights, titles, snd

pr1vileges, :vhatever their origin, in the territory outside
her

Furope~m

frontiers. This me"nt thQt Germrmy no longer

had any title to her overseSiS possessions. This point is
rdavamlt to our subj ect onls in the fact that this concession
belped

Fr~nce

in her policy of security. It completed the

isolation of Germ2ny from the rest of the 'i'lorld. Of all
the former

Germ~n

colonies, Prance received only a portion

of equatori:al f.frica and the Mandfitte of

all

section of

Togol"nd. 'Ehe rest of the Germ:;n colonies were distributed
as follows:*
German E:Iil.st Africa;

Tant::anyika terri tory -British !V:andate
Ruanda

~nd

Urundi

Kionga Tri.ngle
German

.

~outhwest

-restored to
Portugal

Mandate of Unjon of S.A.

Africa;

KQ.merun;

French C&meroon
-Frencb M:mdate
French equatorial Africa -restored to Fr.
British Cameroon
-British Mandate

Togoland;

French 'l'ogol snd
British
"

''Nestern

New

Nauru;

~',amoa;

Zeal~nd

-French Mandate
-British "

Mandate

British Mandate

Former Kaiser r,ilhelm Land;

*

-Belgium Mand2te

Austr~ '118n
M:mdate
,

The Treaty of Versailles -- Part III
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Marignne lsllionds;
Caroline Islands;
Pelew lsl~nds;
Marsh2ll Islands;
The lease of

~hantung,

J~.pa.nese

lv;andate

negotiated from China in 1898, was

renounced in favor of Japan. This was especially to apply
to the Kiao-chow peninsula.
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Chapter V
The DisarnllmJent of Germ.ny
By the terms of the Armistice, Germfllny agreed tod1ss01ve
her army

~nd

to surrender to the AJ lie s prfll.ctic.] ly tbe

whole of her mi 1 i tlitr:; "nd n.vlitl equipment. 'l'llis included
ber bro.ttle fleet, her submarines, her hesv:; l'Irtillery, her
macbine guns, her munjtions, "nd ber
power was

r~tAd

as such in

Europe~n

m"te proportion of its army

~nd

~irplaDes.

A grelitt

afflilirs by the litpproxi-

nlilvy to the size of tbe

country. Although tbis WlitS not wbat h:istorians ususlly
wrote in tr'eir books, it

WIiOS

every diplomGt knew. The

'Jb~t

purpose bebind the disarmament megsures of ty,e Paris diplomats is therefore clear:

it

w~s

to reduce Germ.ny from tbe

status of a great power. However, it was stated in the Treaty
tbus; "In order to render possible the initiation of a generlill limitQtion of tbe armb>ments of litl]

n~tions,

Germany

undertEkes strictlJi to observe tbe military, navlitl, and
litir clauses which follow."*

This cJliluse in the treaty

that forces disarmament on Germany seems to be the one so
long sought by
standir~g

Fr~nce.

By it, Germany

U2S

limited to a

iiirmy of 100,000. 'l'hese 'i'iere to be devoted exclusi ve-

ly to the ma:intenance of order within tbe territory 9nd to
the control of the frontier.
Universal compulsory
Fbolished in

Germ~ny,

~nd

milit~r~

service was to be

the grmy

WFS

vVbolJ y of volunteers, serving for

Iii

to be constituted

period of twel ve yelilrs.

* The Treaty of Versailles -- Part V -- line 1-3
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All the fortific&i-tions, fortresses, :md field works si tu~t
ed in

Germ~ny

to the west of a line drawn 30 miles to the

ea_st of the Rhine were to be disliOrmed

~nd

dismantled and

to rem8in so, and the cens tructi,-,n of any new fortlfication was strictly forbidden.
The naval clauses

0~re

just as severe in that they

limited the navy to 6 battleships (small type), 6 light
cruisers

~nd

This

be compared with

c~n

12 each of the destroyer and torpedo types.

battlesr-ips, 14 cruisers,
tog:;ther

'tli

th~t

of

Pr~nce

which was then 10

lmd 147 of tr,e other types,

th 42 submarines, which were strictly forbidden

the Germlilns. A]so tbe navy force was limited to 15,000
men, including officers.
In respect to tbe pir forces tbe Treaty read, "The
armed forces of Germlilny must not include IiIny military or
naval

li1

ir forces.

"~l-

Thus GermGny was reduced to

power, never to Y'ise aglilin. Her

~

charliictf;ristic equipment of the

m:iichine-~ge

Iit_

minor

rmy was deprived of the
liind obliged to

renounce the use of heavy artillery, tanks, poison glilS, and
~irplanes;

her navy was forbidden to build, buy, or own

submarines, her wlilr-harbor of Heligoland was destroyed, her
fortifications on the left bank of the Rhine COi.lld not be
ma:ntllined. In short, she was to be open to

inv~sion

from

every side and she!lould be unable to defend herself y{ben
invaded. She was put in such a position tlHi,t she 'Nould
never be able to invade Imother country b-;; land, &ir or water.
Tbis

*

~as

the realization of the long sought desire of France.

The Treaty of Versailles -Part 5, Section 3, Article 198
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She felt th~t the disarmament of Germany would render
security both for herself and for tbe newly erected boundaries of Europe.
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Chapter VI
The Financial and Reparations Clauses
The first clause of the reparations section of the
Treaty fixed the

~ar

guilt. l t read, "The Allied and

Associated Governments affirm Io1nd

Germ~my

responsibility of Germany and her

~IJies

accepts the
for c8using all

the loss and dlilmage to which the Allied and Associated
Governments

~;nd

their nationals have been subjected as a

consequence of the war imposed upon them by tbe aggression
of Germany and her allies. II~.
This did not relate merely or primarily to the legal
l,abili ty for damgge which had been accepted by Germany in
the Armistice, but it was designed to establish the fact
that the 'Nar had been caused by Germany, and itw:;os required of German representliiti ves to sign this docmnent as
a confession of crime. It was the disclosure of the purpose
of the Allied peoples to deu1 with the Germans as a guilty
people.

T~is

guilt clause was the climax of the Treaty. Up

to this time, feeling had been held in to a certlain extent.
It had appeared first in the French spirit of revenge, then
by the British in their desire for the German colonies,
but each time '.'ii1son was a.b1e in a measure to supress these.
This flna1 clause expressediiith utter unanimity by the
Allied peoples ruined the -J'!ho1e purpose of' the 'I'reaty, in
that it destroyed the fundamental prjncip1es on which the
Treaty

*

WIiOS

supposed to have been based. "The Germans must

The Treaty of Versailles -Part 8, Section 1, Article 231

40

be ruil ty because :;11'_ f\llied peoples unanimously bel ieved
and knew tbem to be fuilty. In no democracy was there opposition; in

~ll,

the verdict was

un~n1mous.

The very failure

of the Germ:m people to ,"cknowledge the truth thus establisbed, became a new proof of the t;lccur"c), of the indictment. TI
~ith

the above as a basis, the

Rep~rations

clauses

were put down. The Allies recognized the inabj.lity of Germrny to pay for the entire war, so they specified deftnite
items for which
first,

compens~tion

was to be made. These were;

all damRfe done to civiliwns of the Allied

Associ~ted

~nd

towers and their property; second, the restora-

tion of Belgium; and last, the restoration of that pGrt of
France which the Germa.ns had destroyed. The amount of tbis
repEration was to be

det~rmined

by a Reparation Commission

sppointed at tbe Conference. In these clauses the Conference
was not writing a mere contract of dollars and cents, but
it was deaJ ing with blood-rRV'i passions still pulsing through
the people's veins. It was

imj~ossible

to ignore the huml>ln

factors, but provisions were made vihereby they could be
reduced or eJimiD!>ted later, and 1fihereby, the Reparation
Commission, in the procf';ss€S of enforcement, might become
a flexible instrument of ::isdom and justice. "No one CRn
understand the peace treat)' who does not know end csnnot
measure the humrn condi tions under which it wa s brought
forth. It is singular but true that peGce seemed very beautiful durjng the war, but almost ha.teful when the war ended.
From

R

pt the

sllperficial survey of the conditions that prevsiled
Pe~ce

Conference one would

~~ve

been quite justified

41
in assuming t.hat

IT

an;y of the participants preferred war

with all the borrors to any peace short of ttia.t wh ich tbey
demrmded. 'rheir demands hRd their genesis in deep-rooted
~.nd

a 1 most ineradiCBb1e hatreds lolnd in tbe lnsistent desire

for self.-prot ec tion liga inst future danger. "?~

Although the

ftllied Powers r,ad IiIgreed to a l'elilce upon the blisis of 1"resident 1'ilson' s Fourteen Points,

~

tbe principlf's of

settlement were to be formulated not in the

j

nterest of Ger-

mlilny, but to promote tbe !'ea.l interest of the Allies themsel ires and to

adv~nce

the cause of world peace lilnd future

security, public opinion

ch~ged

so mucb tllat tbe

dele8~tes

were forced to ch&.nge also. Examples of this change are
shown in Frsnce by the dlilcards proclaiming "que 1't.llemlilgne
pliye d'Bbord" (Let Germ:.o.ny pay first) which covered the
walls of Paris during the days of the Conference, by the
refusal of the French to adopt any immediate

t:;;x~tion

mea-

sures, insistjng thlit Germ&,ny should IiIssume the burdens
of the war, and in I<ngl and by the reel ection of Lloyd George
on the basis of an increase in the severity of the tsrms
peace,

f

speci~lly

been aroused to

B.

tbose of

repar~tion.

wh i te heat of

fe~r,

~

Publie opinion had
hatred, :;ond distrust.

Facing these facts, one can EBSily r891ize the impossibility
of arri vine: at

Ii

treaty free from passion Iilnd a sense of

wrong.· V!itb this in mind, the demand for the immedlate
payment of $,50,000,000 .s the flrst instal]ment of Reparations, together with almost 400,000 head of ]jve stock and
immense quantities of coaland dyestuffs, cIOn be partly

*

Baruch -- The Making of the Rep~rQtions ~nd Economic Sections
Qf tl1e Peace Treaty
pg. 5 & 7
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justified. The

rem~inder

of the

of the Commission will be 8i yen
the live stock, cOlil.l,
dev~st~ted

are~s

Rep~rlOltions
l~ter.

~s

the report

h~ndlng

over of

md other supplies by GermloO.ny to the

of Frfmce IOInd Bel gium

minds of the French

rl'he

~nd

justified in the

Wio.S

only legjtimate. The

Germ~ns

compare

d
Fr~nce

dem~nding

these to Shylock

dem~ning

his pound of

flesh to w}lich his bond entitles him. They depict Frlil.nce as
f~natic,

blinded by hatred, possessed with the mlil.nia of

destroying her enemy, and
interest.

~cting

contr~ry

to her obvious
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Chapter VII
The
On

H~ll

M~y

of Niirrcrs at Versailles, June 28,1919

the 7th, 1919, the Treaty was ready for

present~-

tion to tr,e German deleglittion. Tbey were told peremptorily
that no round t&.ble discussion VI;as to be allo'.lcd. 'l'bey
mig:ht, however, communicate in wri ting their obj ections to
the tc'ms submitted. 'l'ttis the J did. Count Von Brocl-:dorffRsntzRu, the head of the

Germ~n

lenftl~y

protest ""hj cb st&'tl';d ttle

out tbe

f~.ct

tb9t tbe

trc~t)

based on justice and ttat

d~legaticn,
G~rmliin

vievls. He pointed

of her enemies on repw Iil-

dem~nds

c&p~city

people for pasment, determlned not by tbei r
solel~ b~

their

very

cut to pieces and wesk-

tions. "No lirdt is fixed, save the

life, but

2

'xas supposed to hlilve been

Germ&n~,

ened, could b ardJ y meet the

mgde

capacit~

of the German
st~md"rd

of

to meet the demands of

tbeir enemies by their labor. The German people would thus
be condemned to perpetual s19ve labor.".
M. Clemenceau made

lii

reply to tbe numerous protests

of the Germans that stated: the internvtionsl rights which
she cl:idmed"{pre onlJ temporarlly c:l1tbheld; that it

:i:;OS

not

proposed to exclude her from the League permanently, nor
to erect econemic bliilrriers liieud nst her; that there must be
a

tr~nsition

period durjng whjcb the economic balance was

to be restored; and that Germany
tion. He majntained that it was

w~s

~

to redeem her reputa-

peace, not of violence,

but of justice; that it was not based on condonation of the

*

Count Von Brockdorff-Rantzau -- Letter to M. Clemenceau
as President of the Paris Peace Conference. From "Great
Eyents of the Great TIar" Vol 7 -- see bibliography.
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events of 1914-18; that reparation for wrongs inflicted was
of tne essence of Justice: that GermanJ was responsjble for
the '.'Jar bec&luse for m=-.ny years her ruJ ers had striven for
a "position of dorr:iLance :in Europe" and attempted to "dictate
lind tyrannise to a subservient Europe"; that they sought to
"sow hostility and suspicion instead of friendship between
nations; that they had developed a. system of espionage and
intrigue wh1 ch enabled them to stir up

intf:rna~

rebellion

Bnd unrest, and even to make secret offensive preparations
wi tbin the terri tori es of thej.r neighbors, whereby they
might strike them down with greater security lilnd ease";
that tte German Revolution could not be counted
tte

Germ~m

liil.S

absol ving

people f ror:l these crimes against Hum£mi ty and

Ripht, for the Revolution bRd been 8t,&'-yed until the German
armies h9d vanished by a WQr of conquest; and fjnally that
it was impossible toexpect the free nations of the world
"to sit dovm immedjateJy in equal association with those by
wbom theJ have been so fi'rievously 'i'!ronged". This :;.J.rticle
consisted of some 20,000 words and expressed perfectly
the AlJ ied atti tude. Finally,

li'.

fter much din y-dall ying

;.

on the part of tbe Gerrr.ans, the'J' were summoned to VersSlilJ.es,
their counter-proposals having been rejected as f 9St as
they were offered. A curt ultimatum was issued that they
should eitber sign without dela-y or there would be a renewal of the war.*
Thus on June 28,19]9, the

~owers

of the World met,at

the 1J all of Mirrors in Vers "illes, in the exact spot where
the German Empire had been proclaimed in 1871, on th e fifth

*
»

C. F. liorne,editor - The Great Eyents of the Great War
George Clemence~u - Lett~r to tbe President of the Germ~
Delegation covering the Reply of tne AJlied ~nd Assoc.Powers.
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anniversary of the historic pistol-shot which killed the
Austrian liI.rchduke and whjch had ever s';nce filled the world
with its deli/fening echoes. The Trelilty was read:y 1n almost
the orih':j_na] form thlilt it hlild been pres ented to the Germans
on Vay 7. The two ~crmen deleggtes, Be]] and MUller, prlilctical] y unknown men, signed the

Tre~.lty.

hll

the

ori{dn~l

deleg[ltef" had resigned, refusing to accept the terms of the
Treaty. Thus was Ede:ned

Tre~t;y

liI

th~t W&E-;

to

ch~nee

policies, economic, finQncial,9nd political, of

+-r-e

practlclill~

every nation of l'urope, especially tbose of France and Germany.
In spite of' the humiliating conditions,Germany was
forced to sign, she stl11 had her undy ing spiri t.
hl?rdJy felt tbilt ::!he

V/liiS

Germ~ny

v!;nquished; she felt proud of the

formidabl e r esistence she had so long op.posed to the entente;
her armies may h:;ve c:';iven wa-y jn the end, but at lef.ist they
h~d

not known defeat bind she hed alwgys },<ept "the ;, sr v!ithln

tbe bounds of

t,J:"Je

enemy's t "'rri tory.

;~·he

'.'\Tas conscious that

her s trenfth in numbers surpas sed tbose of

Fr~mce.

F'urther-

more, the Germans c'herished at he8rt the convicUon thst sh e
had a brj fhter future

t;b~m

P-rance ::;nd +;11e hope that France

may die because of her oym very victory.
ThUS, IiIlthough the

Germ~_ns

seemed humiliated :;ot the

terms of Versailles, their never dying sf)irit still burned
Idnd tr:ese acts of France only added fuel to the f1 arne of
hatred between the two nations.

Part II
From Versailles to Lecarne
1$119-23
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ChRpter I
The PoJicy of Germany
"In tbe eyes of

:;1

J peoples,

the

iJO] j

cies of otter

nations seem based upon s Ifish considcrliitions, vihile their
own

~ppf[lr

firmly"stRblished on right c;nd reason. But, in

fact, R]l national policies Fre sjmi1HrlJ founded upon
pureJy

parochi~J

dsn~·ers.

estim~tes

of domestic intprests

~nd

foreign

j',nd, in support of these pol j cies, every people

employs the mesns it deems most appropriate, dispJEys the
s I?me unconcern for the effect of its pol icy upon oU'er
nations, and rejects with utter scorn proposals for amendments ceming f ror.1 abroad.

,~imillOlrl;y,

~lJ

peop] es found treir

progrDmme of peace upon the renunciRtion of weapons useless
in their own hands, but dangerous in those of others."*
In keeping ,':i th these principles we

m~.y

~~tRte

th~t

the

policy of Germany since tbe ')'igr riGS been that. of escape
from the system of the

'rre~ty

of

'v'ers~illes

through aboli-

tion of reparetions payments, removal of the unilateral
dis~rmament

circwnstances and, fjnslly thro'lgh revision

of the territorial clausps of the treaty.
The terms of the 'l're:olty of VersIii',illes CGme to the Germsn people as an

utterl~'

incomprebensible decision. In the

pronouncements of ',ilson they l:;",d seen H;e promise' of a
generous peace and a prompt restor2+:ion of the German nf1tion
to its pre-war position. And, :olS a conquence, the compltcated and terrible conditions of the Psris .2Attlement seemed
at one time" violRtion of the .11.rmistice terms and the

*

2imonds -- Can Europe Keep the Peace

pg. 129
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the revelation of a purpose to make German recovery 1mpossible for tilJ time. As a consequence the Germans have
adopted tbe above policy.
First in regard to the

Rep~r~tions.

Germany was re-

quired to deposit ¢,50,OOG,000 with the Allied Governments
immed:.tately before the amount of the final sum

WBS

decided.

The amount of thls first poyment, hovrever, i::ilve the Germans
a clue that it would be enormous. Un May 1, 1921, the
approxim~te1y

Commission had fixed the German debt !.<t

~31

billions. Under this programme, the 9mount due December
~1,100,000,000.

31,1922, ;':ou1d Y9ve amounted to
time, the CTerm:;ons [1ad p::oid but

~>654,OOC!,000.

At this

'l'he Commission,

[101JlleVer, unanimous l ;; rFduced ttem for the year of J 92~,
so trat

;~.875,000,000

wr..s due for tLfJt 20 months

the four yeErs' time, Germ£ny hQd

p~id

period~

In

in cash and deliveries

in kind about 1200 mill ion doll ars, about balf of which had
gone toward costs of the armies of occupation.
inter~l]ied

arr~ngements,

01;~!in2_;

to

most of the remsinder hed Gone

to BeJriUln. FrsnceL{,ld r81ized nothlng in liquid form
which could be applied to her costs of reconstruction. In
November 1922, Germany aSk for

B.

lr.or8torium of tbree or

four years, excepting for certbin deliveries in kind for
the

dev~ststed

areas, giving as

r~ason

the economic condi-

tions of the country. This filled the French

~ith

appre-

hension. The British, however, sided with the Germans. On
thjs rock Britain and France parted.
Immediately thereafter, the British adopted e policy
of 2bstaining from the pr5ncipsl debgtes
~\-

~nd

decisions of

Office of tr}e Rep:ilr:iltion P~yments - 'l'he Execution of the
Experts P1:iln to M~y 17,1930
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the ReparaU_Ol1:3 Commission. Germany Has in defau} t on her
deliveries of coal and other Materials. The
Commission

decl~red

R~paration

the deffiuJt a voluntary one, and the

French, supuorted by the Belgians, on January 11,1923,
moved into the Ruhr Valley in order to collect, under duress,
the reparations which Germany, according to the French, were
wilfully wi tbolding. 'l'he Rubr consti t;'J.ted one of the greatest coal and industri&l

:itr~;},js

of the world {Ond

'.'ifQS

the v(:ry

heart of economic Germany. GreQt Britain's protest against
the French action encoursged Germany to declarp it illegal.
Ruhr t';overnment and fsctory officials, as well as the workers,
ii/ere exhorted from Oer] in to In lk tht: French des :i.8~ns by
mc:::;;ns <!J)f the formid:;bJ eveapon of passiveresistence. Against
this first plan of Poincare's th"t of a

sn~all

body of ex-

pprts supf'rvising the RuJlr industries and turni:,-e': the profi ts
into tr,e French treasury, he

WfiS

obI iged to brhg a

v~st

army across tbe Rhjne in order to set the rec&lcitrant Germans to

~ork

under milit8ry compulsion. The result was

never in doubt, IOlnd in ::ier'tember 1923, Germ:;ny surrendered
uncondj ti onQJ] y. The first

att~ck

upon the Treety of Vpr-

sRil] es hHd faj led.*
The next point on whj cn tl:e GE:rmans have attempted a
revision is

th~t

of trie uni] ateraJ disarmament. In tt'e months

follow"ng tLe Treaty, the
looked more J ike a VlOst

e~lausted

m~d}'ouse

and defeated

t:rj~n

Gpr~any

an ord:'Y'ed ci vilized

soc iety . " i tb th0:l r seemIng-solid inherited institutions
falling about -tll€ir el3rs the

st[~rved,

war-shocked people clutched wildly at

disillusioned, and
~ny

straw

th~t

appeQr-

~~ Noyes ~nd Fuller - The French occupation of the Ruhr
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ed to offer spcurity aga:l.nst immediate destruction.*

An-

other rr'volution I'Tas hlngl1ing. A communist revol t occurred
in tree neutr&11.zed terri tory

~long

the Rhine • .in order to

put do:n the revolt, the Germ:..n GoverrL'TIent requested permission to move troops into the area. ':;ithout waiting
Rutr:,orization, the Germans marched 20,OGO men into the liOrea
and overcame the revolution. The French protested.
Difficulties @lso arose over

~ircr~ft.

The Treaty pro-

hib! ted Germ9ny from h:.ving any rriJ 1.tary airpJ anes. But
'Nhat l,'Vas tie differAncc between mil itsry and cormw,rcia1
pJanes'?

Gprm~n-y

fjnRlly resched an agreement to the effect

that planes having

cert~in

qualities of speed and strength

were to be re8arded as military planes and hence prohibited.
Like 1Nis'o, quest:ir·ns lIl.rose [,s to tbe m&int:;linence of
armed police forces. 'l'be

d~nger

of revolution liInd of crime

follovJing t1 e armi stice in 1918 became so great tbet the
Ger:1:.ans est&b] isbed several ne':] police orgf'-nizatiur:s. Tbese
forces ,vere fully

h

rmed and the

li1]

ied

Governrr.(~nts

soon

said that itlv'as a military force, the existence of which
violated the peace treaty. Likewise the

~llies

complained

at the end of 1920 tbat Germlilny had fa:i led to destroy a
large quantity of :;Jrms. in answer to these protcsts, it was
stated that it

VIRS

ethic:a1ly unsound and physicsll,- :tm-

possible to fiittempt to keep the l:.rgFst nat:ton :in Europe
:tn a pros tr2te condj t ion, w1"l:tle her ne ighbors armed to
their heart's desire.

*Schevi11- A History of Europe

,.
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As to the revision of the t erri tori~l b01mdHrle s, the
Germans were stopped. Their only victory

WQS

in the pleb-

iscites: In the Schleswig zones, the southern section elected

Germ~_ny,

to

Germ~ny:

in eQstern Prussia both plebiscite areas went
in Upf:er '::;i1esia ttw plebiscj te went to Germany,
~nd

but the allies were resolved that this rich mining
industrial area should not rem" in with GermanJi

~md

on dividing it between Germany and Pollmd in such
th~t

mines

the over'Nhe1ming preponderance of its coal
~ere

h~nded

over to the resuscitated Slav

'·ith all these eVRsions stopped
rema~ns--unshaken,

Germ~ny

insj sted
::1

~nd

-.nq

zinc

St~te.

rem~ins--and

lind German po1ic;y is still for revislon.
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Chapter II
The .tolicy of France
As has frequently been pointed out, a continous insistence on security is the dominlmt moti ve of the French
pol icy. Tl:e ins} stence, logj ca] E'lDough in its essentials,
seems on its p"rticuJars to amount to an absession. Yet
what the French actually

me~n

by security is neither quite

simple, nor by any mBlilns self evident. lt is not, for example, merely" question of frontj.ers, arm'es or limited
guarantees. hn the contr:ory, it is primarily the French
desire of the establishment in Europe of a system of order.
And, quite naturlilllJ',

tr~eir

system of order conforms to

French conception.
Clemenceau, thus, "t the

P~ace

Conference made every

effort to insure Fr:;;nce security. "He was Unimpressed by
lNilson's idealistic progrlilmme, wllich

#lilS

the :Lclil.gue of

1"lat10ns, ;md he was unconvinced by Foch's prescription of
permlilnent occ;pation of the left

b~nk

of the hhine. he

regarded the former scheme as Utopian, &nd the latter as a
vagary of a

milit~r)

mind. For him the single formula of

security was the preservation of the war time associations
of bis

0'1V!l

countr) with the two English-speaking

nations."~r

He tl,())ught that he had realized this when it was incl uded
in the Treaty of Verslililles, but when the United States
SAnate rejected it/ the rrrelilty of GUarantee fell lilDd
Clemenceliu's pol icy -;"fas jn ruins "nd Lis own po] i tiCR]
c~reer

*

was at an,end.
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The international relations of Europe until recentl-y
have been based on the principle of the Bal&nce of Power.
This

the dividing up of the nations

WBS

b~

alliances, since

they could no longer be di vided into states of equal miJ i tary
:;ond economic power, to tbe point th&t no

Stliit~

vould be

able single-banded to impose its will upon the rest of the
world.
c

1

Such was H'e

c~se

~;,t

the beginning of the

Gre~t

-ar. ln 1917 the situation sudd nlJ c(;t;;ngedi +;he TSIiI_r of

Russia

overthrown; Russia flithdrew from the war; a

w~s

Bolshevist Government

c~me

into Vower; it rppudigted the

of the old r 0 [ime RDd proclaimed its intention

oblig~tions

of bringing on

iii

world revolution. Hussia, t:ne ally of

France, had become the enemy. The French therefore, believe
that there is ('snrer tbat these two outcast st&tes of
Europe -- Russia IiInd Germany -- might form an alliance to
overturn the 'ferslilill es settJ ement,

md dominate the con-

t1nent. Under these impulses of the B:ill.nce of Power conceptions

~nd

believing in the implacable hatred of Ger-

many, French policy aimed to keep
new

~llies

Germ~ny

weak Fnd to find

to bolster up the Frencb position to offset

Germany1s superior man-power.
Thus

'Ne

see J:<'rance in the next period negotiating with

the powers of England, BeJ gium, f'ollOnd, Luxemburg, and the
new Slavic States for treaties of defense
or to SArve as allies for her.

~he

~glOinst

Germany

tried to get the League

to establish an int'rnational army, !:Ind Britain and the
Uni ted St:otes to
failed.

t~Uarlilntee

the Peace, but these lrClilsures
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"1.th Germ:ilny temporliolrily crippled by disliolrm:ilmfmt and
economic barriers, France set out to hunt for :illlies. The
first WliolS the smQII stQte of Del gium, who had suffered
from the GermQD jnvliIsion :ilnd bad failed to get her desires
gr~nted

Qt the fCQce Conference in regard to

~erritorial

exp:ms ion and the con trol of the mouths of her two ri vers,
the Scbeldt Qnd
the

~'eQ,

~he

Meuse,

her

vIr,icn were held by Holl

I y (see mlilp on next

plilge~).

only outlets by
~md

VV2i~er

to

fOnd Luxdll.burg respective-

Thus in 2,eptember 1920, the

French Qnd BeJgium military stQffs drew up a
Qgreement providing for reciprocal :ilid in

m~litQry

CQS~

of QttQck.

The questj.on as to the legQlity of the tre:ilty immediQtely
Qrose. rEhe LeQgye of

l~ations

Coverant provided that

Ie]

I

tre8ties should be registereci Qt GeneVQ. 'l'his, the French
liInd BeJp'ium Governmf'nts dec" ined, in fgct tr:ey pven refused to publ ish the text of tbe document. 'J'hey simply
registered some lettf)rs stating
been entered into. It
eitl'erw.as

liolttLcked

with an economic

~as
b~'

t~i:;;;t

defensive

such

:il.Yl~·

~g&inst

greement had

Germany in CBse

her. 'rhe French followed this up

:;lE~reemen t

wt.i ch would tie the two countries

more c i osely togeU:er. Thus we hQve .B'rwcedth her first
QIIy.

*
c~me

Next

PolQnd. It has alrE,Qd) been shown thliOt Frfolnce

WQS responsible mliOinly for the creation of tbi s st8te to
~ct

as

iii

buffer between Germlilny "nd RussiQ. lt

for Poland to seek::> id from France,

:;md it

',diS

'iQS

n:iltural

naturQI for

France to ask Qid from Poland in time of war with either
Russia or Germ&n7j becRuse of rol:md's strategic

loc~tion.

l~i------------------------------------------------------------------

*

p

L1nds~~
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"In 1920 France rushed aid to Poland before any :il.lliance
had been made -- the

occ~sion

being war between

~ol:il.nd

~nd

Russia. In February 1921, the situation was consolida.ted
by the signing of a

politic~1

lilgreement betv'ieen Poland and

France in which they :.ogreed to act together in

~l

questions

of foreign policy relating to the regulation of internatipnal affpirs, in the spirit of the peace treaties lilnd in conformity with the Covensnt of t:he Le:.o.gue of bs.tions."*
This agreement, like th:.o.t: with Belgium, w:.o.s followed by a
commercililJ
:.0.

low

trc-:.o.t:y operline the two countries' m:.o.rkets Gt

t~riff.

Fr~nce

also forwarded

:.0.

Jo~n

of

~lOO,OOO,OOO

to Poland. She had saved the Poles, she now becsme the
gUlilr~ntor

of their cxist"'mce, Gnd the strong Polish IO.rmy,

presently to rise, would moasurab1e repllilce the

Russi~n

on

the eli/stern frontiers of Germany. For the construction of
tLis policy, the f:o.mous fvlillerlO.nd is mainly responsible.
His policy found '[.rider extension under his successors
in Czecho-SJ ovakia, Yugo-Slavia IO.nd Rummia. In J:il.nuary 1924,
the French Government signed 8n

~JJiance

'fIith Czecho-

[:'lovlillria in r.:;gard to

~lDy

attewpted union of Gerrrany IO.nd

AustrilO. or in

~ny

questions Gri s·j ng ref-:'E,rdi ng their

C~SF;

of

security or that of the pe:o.ce trcRties. This

a~roement

was

not m'lit:;.ry as in the CLse of tIle Belgium alliance. Sjmi11O.r
a.grrements were en'

'~red

into wi thYugo-::'l:.o.via IO.nd

Rum~nia.

Thus the Little Entente became 1ike P01and, not only a
mD itary, but a

d:iplor:~tic

bulwark of .brencrl policy. "But

on the othpr hand, French po] icy itse1f was now definiteJy

~~

~-
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This map indicates the position of Bel~ium and
Holland. The control"of the mouths of the Meuse,
ScheIdt and the Rhine are all held by Holland. It
is also to be noted that these are practically the only
accesses that Belgium has to the sea.
The provinces of Eupen and Malmedy are plebiscite areas
that were given to Belgium by the Treaty of Versailles.
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emblilrked upon t:he defence of the stlil,tus quo, not only on the
Rl;ine, but on the Vi stulil.l, the DIiIlube,

&.

nd even the Dniesterl"-l:-

Along with the IiIbove allililnc€s Frlince h&d hopes of
reviv~l

iii

of the ill-fated aJlilince of 1919 with 1nglRnd. FrEnce

hgd vtished Ii cleRr-cut ::J·fre·"lt1fcnt ",'.1 tl
Cordi~le,

Entente

f~n:21lj

&'nd ljad

LEi ~ ~'!I:dv'

obttincd :it

jr~

r

!'

the

ince U e
Tr'~8ty

of Guerr.nty, cnl y to hgve it dr shed to l)ieces by the refusli1 of the United
were mlide for

iii.

~tlites

defensi ve

~enlilte

tre"t~

to rgtify it. Negotililtions
w1.th

Eq:~,1 ~md

~)[~;j

nst Ger-

mRny, but FrGnce considered them one-sided bec2use the British refusod to

accept the incJusion of Po11i1.nd in the de-

fr,nsive clause. The British 0Pl-i0sed this inclusion of.l'ollillld
bec~use

they considered Poland

artificial crefiition

oiii 1 t ic.

in the

JI t

tl~Qt

iii.

protege of France -

threatened the British position

C~nnes in 1922, gn gIl ilince was di scus sed

lit length, only to end in fliilure
ci1~ble

other

bec~use

of this irrecon-

difference oveI' tbe PoJish frontier. Finlil.1 1 y, after

~ttempts

~t

negotiations, Poincare broke the Entente

Cordj~le

by jnv£ding tbe Ruhr

tinent:.]

IiIJ] ililncBs.

~~

R~

~nd

by seeking fUI'thcI' con-

Simmonds -- Can Eur'ope Keep the t'cace?
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Chapter I
The Rhineland and the Ruhr Invasion
The Rhine River flows through ':estern Europe in sucb
iii

mlOnner tlult it

bound~n;

j

s cons idered bJi the Prench

betwe-n Frsnce

~nd

~s

nsturlill

iii

Germ:;ny despi te the flOCt that

the French have only had control of this
The GerrnQns hsve held to tris

territor~

~rea

but once.

throughout the

centuries, sxcept in tr:e ClOse above mentioned when N"poleon
rAliIlized the long-deeired French policy. This territory,
usually referred to

IiIS

tho Rhineland territory, is the

very helilrt of tl:e Germ:'Il industrial world :md is
rich in minerals.

~~1s

territory

w~s

~lso

very

still in dispute at

the close of tte Great tlilr as can be seen by the decision
about

Alslilce-Lorr~ine.

The province of

Als~ce

IiInd plilrt of

that of Lorrliljne are bordered by the Rhirie. ThUS, by the
return of tr,Ase two to Fr:;mce, R p:.:rt of her policy was
realized. There remained, however, the R~lr territory.*
The economic factor, which gives the brench some basis
other ttliln imlerilillism for tt€ desire to control the Ruhr,
is lWQbl@lt In lilt thls point of outstRndlng importlmce. The'
iron deposits of },urope lie in tLe proviLces of
Lorra~n(~

more

1,":h:iJe

tIl('

8dv~ntsfeous

c~lly,

I~J

S9.ce IiInd

cOBl deposits lie in tJ:e Ruhr. Both gre
if controlled by one soverejgnty. Economi-

it is more advantageous to bring the coal to the

iron fer industry. lience, Fr&nce, sjnce she

OTmS

the iron

deposits, consjders it her right to control the coal

~-

~reas

Parker T. Moon - Imperifoilism and Vwrld fol j tics - Chapter
17 - Part 2
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AnottJer flilctor to rel-rlcJ11ber i2 tocd the nstions of the
~re

world

dustry,
theory
co~l.

r&ted

~s

gre~t

intf'rn~Jtion~e1

and
th~t

n~tions

in trsde, in-

domln~nce

Slfffiirs. it is

these dominant

inst~nce,

For

by their

~::

~

80

proven

'prov:i.de tbe vvor1d with

in 1913, the United

~tGtes,

Gre~t brit~in,

and Gerr"liny supp1 ied tte worl d w:i th 81~6 of tLe co 8J used
th~t

ye~r.

The tOt9] output of tte

co~l

of

Germ&n~

grd the

:'Vnence it CBme were;

:;lre~s

Als9ce-Lorr~ine

•••••••••• 3,800,000 tons

S9(lr B:;lsin .••••••••••••• 13,200,000 tons
Upper

~i]esi~

••••••••••• 43,800,000 tons

'l'he Ruhr ••••••••••••••• 130,700, OGO tons
Tot~l

for

Germ~ny

in 1913 ••• 191,500,000 tons

FrQnce realJ) did h9ve some re,son to bc'ieve
w~s

f~st

9ppr09cb1ng her if not

qu~lific8tions

a

I~~enerliltion

:ilcquired the

for

~

greater

~,nd

&lrf~dy

th~t

Germ'ny

her equsJ in the

more domin:;>nt power. Il\jdthin

(tbis refers from the tirr;e wLcn Gerc'!9n;y'
i,] s~ce-j-orndne

terri tory in 18.7J) Gerrumy bliid

by 'peaceful penetration' entered the
world.

*

~pheres

of iri'l uence

~~rknts

of tbe

iC'-re stGked. off in s(;me

1 ~nds;

coloni e s ,',cere cbt:;; in ed in otters. oln comrwn vri th her

policy of imperilO1ism. Every conthlent felt the touch of
Gerrrr.n Kultur; every

se~

c{jlrried 9rgosies under tbe

Flap;. 'hat Bis'l12rck }-q;d done :;I.t IJcme "',ith b100d

~;rd

Germ~n

iron,

bls successors detArmjnedl~o do abr08d ,;jt:} coal ~nd iron."~H~

John Ii:1:ii;y-n9.rd Keynes, 'rl1e Economic CQIlS(;Quencp,s of the .LeSee
pg.88
J,H~ Henry l~obJ e Sherwood, ""The Territori,,"l ~nd Fconomic Roots
of the Ruhr"/1'4 t:tudie s in Ar.,8ric 9n 1-a. story, pg. 33 8
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If these 'Ner' the instruments by i,hicr.i G0:rnulDY hlild
become the rivsl of
them

~t

~ers~illes.

France

cert~inlJ

A1slilce-Lorraine was

r~turned

territory to the Learue, Upper Silesia
end 1,,,,ft to

Gpr'T~ny

put gn end to
to Frpnce,

vere p'i vpn to n er lOnd t:Ho sovereignty of

the .c: aar m1n es
th~t

Fr~nce,

pl E:'bescite,

~

Iii 1]

the

tsken from

WBS

Ger~'1'f!n

colonies

were taken, the spteres of influence dissolved wnd the
Gern~:;m

nlilvy surrendered or destroyed. r1'he only Iilsset of

those nlilmed above left to Gcr!fl:;my
:i.'lOVI/

that the

over German),

s~w

'1Irp~ty

had

be(~n

''''!filS

t:ne Hul1r.

signed France, J ooking

this gnd decided thlilt she needed it more

then Germany.~·
'ith repgrl#tions
the Rul1r on

J~nugry

several grounds.

the main bs::d s France occupied

:;JS

11, 1923.

~oinc~re

~)he

rrsde this decis:ion on

stated the French views in a

note to the Germ:;ms, Jul 'J' 30. It re gd: IlThere must be no
m:i sunderst.anding about our j,urpose 1 n the Rubr; there is
no ques tion of seeking there the jmmecji&te
ment of rep2ra t jons;

~E

~nd

tot:.l pay-

knew very well that tte exploita-

tion of the T\uhr b J the ./-',11ies ',1/ou 1 d not by

j

tSAl f

~none

procure the necessary sums, even ift-;he GcrcrFn Government,
in conformity with the tresty of peace,
take the coal and
there.

Sh~t

COl]

cct t:ne

t~xes

~ad

allowed us to

v,.e had dt-;cided to Jevy

we desired first Dnd especiallJ

w~s

to cr 0 ste

in' Germ~ny by the seizure of pL:dpes snd by coercion, the
w,ilJ to pay; to crF'fjte sucr; embsrrassmen t in the
:;ind

politic~l

the tr 9ty

econo~-r;ic

structlJ.re of t.he Ed.ch th2-!-; the' execution of

','10U 1

d be preferred to

~;l:i

s emb&r:rassmen t; to

..~ Cooke and [':tickney - Re;iH'I1n~s in EUrOpefilD- International
Relations - Page 897 - Dariac's Report to President Poincare
May 28,1922.
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obt~in

wh:o;t· -.'e n:..ve not obtained for t.he

namely, the recognition of

Germ~ny

1:;~3t

four years,

of her obliga+:,ions, not

from the e;eneral 8nd theoretic poi.nt of view lIrut from the
practic~l

point of vie','!. "-1:-

Poincare bad in 'ind tbe def8u1 t

8

of

Germ~my

in her

repDr&tion pa,';ml'lnts. TYe first default came in lVlay, 1921.
By the rrc;lce Trelilty, Gprmlttny
gold of which she only paid

WlilS

to pa.y :;:-5,000,000,000 in

~1,250,000,000.

of the Reparliltions Commission of May, 1921,

By the decision
Germ~IDY

mils to

pay dur5ng tbe ye"rs 1921 and 1922 an :annulil sum of $500,
000,000, plus a sum eqm11 to 26% of her pxports, wbich l:.-tter

sum hlild berm estimated very conservatively at
lil

~:500,OOO,OOO

year. This made s tot91 of E2,000,000,OOO for the two

years. vf this Germany paid 4500,OOO,OCO, v.hlch was :mother
default. Germany :;<lso def:,.ulted in her

Pfi~lr.lpnts

wood to France. Of the /ij1most 14 million tons of

of c021 lind
co~l

she

was Sllpposed to deliver in 1922, France only received a
little over 2 million tons. This Jast default led to the
decision

t~kt=:n

fplt right in
that in
t8ke

c~~;e

in the
dojn~

inv~sion

th~s

uf the Huhr valley. France

because the

Pe~ce

Treaty provided

of lil·dl:L'ul defa.ult, the nations elm [;0 in and

econom~c,

f1D8nc1t1 Lnd any

desire to take. This dpcisioD

ot~8r

W9S

s~nctions

that they

rost serious, however,

because the Rrench, in occupy ing trle Ruhr, drew deliberately
QVfgy

from :t:ne1:md, who VJas strongl

y

opposed to any such

:!'lction.
The Germgns recei ved this strgnglllatH;n:. of' their in-

*
..
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dustrial center by the }i'rench militLry forces

lOS

iJ legal,

pi.rr]t;iC}'J], brutr,;] Jy imperi81 istic !and ruinous, not only to
GArmany but to the rest of Europe. It is evidsnt that
therr:: v"Fe' a

r~dic~l

difference between the .brench and Ger-

man points of view.
The Gert!19.ns arc ~ nized and detcrm).ncd to res] st tDe
French act ion "lith "pss s1 ve rc s is tarnce". The French were
just as rr:so1 ved in +-beir Rction and the Cr nf} ict became
of

~

vitliilly serious chBrGcter.
The result was thlilt

Germ~n

tr:.de collapsed under the

crushing weipht of the burdens imposed by the Rubr conflict.
1"ith these two functions, thE') industry and the trade, cut,
the

fjYl~nces

of GeI'm&:ny col] apsed also. 'l'hus, France f:-.11-

ed to obt:aj n the end she sought Hid liil so 1 earned that for ce
was a weapon of the past. From this time on a change can
be seen in the French policy.*

-4:-

p

From a person:.oJ interviewd th 8ir Herbert Ames, lV;ini ster
of Finance of the League of Nations. 1919-1926
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Chapter 1.1
The Dawes Plan and Germany
In occupying the Ruhr in J anu~ry 1923, F'rfmce had
exacted her pound of fJAsh snd obliged Germany to surrender. '<:he

h~.d

forced German finlilnce into bankruptcy and had

brougr:t about, or induced tIle

Germ~ns

to br'ing about, the

complete social and economic disorgfnization of the Heich.
By the end of AUEust 1923, the Germans had reached the end
of their tether

~nd

made an abject submission. The govern-

ment had paid the helil.vy bill of
running off more

~nd

p~ssive

rf;sistance by

more paper marks from t.he printing

presses untj] it took millions Iilnd even hundreds of millions
to buy an Americ:;1n dollar, wheras, in pre-war days, the
dollar was quoted as a 1 ittle more than four. 'rhe national
treasury

WS.S

nov! banvrupt and the entire individual savings

wiped out, leaving Germany a nation of paupers. Business too,
vras at a shmdstill
mark

~nd

t.he

f~ct

bec~mse

of the worthlessness of the

thet German trade :had been cut off from

the rpst of thn world since the outbreak of the

'l~ar.

The hope of a prOlnpt stgbil ization of }<,urope had
rested upon tl:e Anglo-French entente. 'l'hat hope had long
since disappeared in a wel tAr of recrimi nlilt.ions.
were loud in their denunciation of the l:'rench

rrhe~ng]

OCC'.l.p~.tion

ish
of

the Ruhr:~ The effect of tbis out/-cry hardened tbe French
and they determined to stand pat.
IlAmong the Gerrrans, organized resistancE'" to tl10 occupation had ceased Iii th the brmkruptcy of t.heir government. But

-J,:.

p
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GermQ.n resentment s t II 1 glo':/ed ,vi th Q.n intense heQ.t. :::'uperftctally, Q.t leRst, tt

~ppeRred

Q.s strong

88

the deep

sense of unredressed injury which RnimQ.ted t.he people of
Frlilnce. "*
In MQy 1923, Germlolny lilsked th:;>t the reparstion question
be referred to Q.n internRtionlill body of experts. Britain
VIRS in fQ.vor of this Rnd invited the United .'::Jtatps t,o
pertic1.pRte in thi s inquiry to det'rmine Germany's c:;<paci t-y
to pRy. Fr&nce w&s

re]uct~nt

lilt first but the acute

finQ.ncial s1tut<t10n forced her to enter. in November 1923,
the ReplilrliltionsCommission f:7stabl ished two

C',

"'mi ttees of

experts from various countries, th€' first to study the
means of balancing the GermQ.n budget liind of stlf.bi1izing
the mQ.rk; the s8cond icVRS to determine the Q.mount of GermQ.n
clitpi t ,,1 exported Q.broild &nd the pOS:3 i ble met;:lOds of bringing it bRck to Germlilny.
The hmericans th&t served on this Commission were
Owen D. 'loung, henry'. Hobinson,

~md

General ChQ.rles G.

DQ.vies, vl'hence the nQ.me the 'DQ.wes .t'lRn'. These men served
wi thout official connection 1/-'1 th the United States Gov ernmente
The Committee met in .t'lilris in the eQ.rly spring of 1924.
Their pJ&n w&s outlined Q.S two-fold; first to study the
Currency; :and second to study the Budget. Th8 first ttlsk of
the experts

'.'1IilS

to deterrrdne how much Uie G';;rlmm people

should be Q.sked to paJ.

~he

Dlilwes Plan

WRS

necessarjly

intricQ.te in its actulill details. its mlilin feQ.tures

~~

~ere,
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wholly
by

contr~st,

very simpJe.

~t

W~SA9n

economic plan

fO.lthough "politic91 considerations necBss9rily set certain
limits within which a solution must be found."
As a result of tbts inflRtion, Germany had wiped out
its domestic debt. The victorious nations, by contrRst,
since they were meeting tbe costs of their domestic debts,
wou] III be unfairly

h9ndic~pped

in the 1Norld markets, if

they were compell ~;d to compete with German production,
freed of all domestic taxatj_()ll reSl 1 t:ing from the war. rrhus
the

D~wes

Commission took

its basic principle that

9S

equ:;llity of burdens IJbould be the melOlsure, hence the principIe of "comrnensurlilte taEation."
The first measure of the

Co~nission

was to put

Germ~ny

back on her financial feet by an international loan of
$200,000,000. This was to be provided by tbe foreign market
of bonds, chiefly in tbe United
tion of this

fl1UTI

WIiiilS

~tlil.tes

and britQin. A por-

to be retGilned in Germ:;my to support

the rentem9rk, tbe b:;;l ~nce w,," s to supply p9-rt of the funds
necessary for reparations p&yments

dur~ng

tbe e ... rJy period

when direct German contributions must be inconsid8rable.
There was created

Iiiil

central bro.nk of issue, subject to

foreign supervision,:hicb, in ro.ddition to issuj_nr currency,
was to conduct all tbe complic::.ted operatlon of financing
the de] i veries in kind on account of reparations, recei ving
from tbe government the necesstilry funds.
Lastly, the Dro.wes Plan provided for the payment of
reparations on

Iiiil

sl

iding scale, which started witb

million for the flrst year,

-

~300

~250

miJlion for the second
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and third, and rosr, to
wss

~lso

estQblished

~t

~;625

million in the fifty. There

this base a principle that

~~

no

time should any pa:VlI'.ent in c8sh or kind be made when such
p~yment

threatened to disturb German exchange.

~wing

to her present bankr.uptc-y and to the firumcial

scepticism wilich this condition

ent~iled,

other features of

the Plan put Germany under foreign tutelage by obliging
her to accept allied control of her railroads, and a specified group of revenues in addition to tbe contro1 of the
bank of issue.
"Broad]y speaking, the Dawes flan thus proposed to fix
Iil.

scale for German payments based on GermlOlTI caplil.ci ty and

safcg:uarding German intprests. lH the same time it f'srgblished the principle that;,

subject to bonest endea.vour and

reasonabl e fuJ fillment, Germany should be once for

:;0]

1 freed

from a]] thre&t of foreign coercion, assured not only
mastery wi thin ber own frc,ntiers, but protection against
all

intervention. "~~
The approval by France of the lJawes t'lan marks the

beginning of

Il

change in her policy towards the reparliltion

question. rJ.1here are probabJ y several reasons for tlijs
clu.nge. First is that of the \\ashingtpn Conference, where
FrIlnce received her first; blow by being put on a b@sis with
Italy

~nd

by being ranked as a tIdrd rlilte naval pOllver. 1' 'he

second blow clil.me at Cannes when the German delegate
reiterated the inlilbj 1 i tJl of ld.s country to meet the r"purstions due and was granted a moratorium. 'J.1he third event is

~:-
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marked by the French Occup:iltion of the Ruhr. This move
definitely hardoned the British feeling toward France :ilnd
it

~lso

proved to Frhnce

th~t

force was a weapon of the past.

At this same time the condition of French finances were in
such a state that this too proved :iln j'1portant reason for
the }'rench sanction of the }'xperts Plan.
liThe supreme me ri t of the Dawe s 1-'l:m ]

fF,'f

in th e f a.c t

th:ilt it definitely removed the reparations issue from
politics. The

Ger~an dem~nd

determination of

for an expert Bnd scientific

Germ~n c~p~city

to pay 'Nas satisfied

absolutely. ~n the other hand, the French contention that
Germany could pa;i and must pay was simi 1 ~rl;:i sustained.
~'ince,

moreover, the schedule fixed by the London ultimatums

of 1921 had provided that Gernumy should pay $250,000,000
in 1921 and $500,000,000 in succeeding ye:ilrs, the actual
reduction was not con siderable. tI~:But the moral

v~lue

of the Dawes Ylan surpassed the

material. It cut down the compl:\.clilted and contr8dictory
provi S1 ons, of the Vers ,dlles

Tre~ty

into

s j mple !;nd

If

stra ightfor'iJard programme, gi vinE the Germ=-ns a definite
contrDct \filth a d;m light of national recovery and the insurance IiIgal nst interference, ; Ihile it gave the French, as
well as the otber Allies, an

a.ssur~nce

of the payment of

the reparations.
'rIle D:iilwcsl bin was adopted

Q

t

Londo~'

by the fillies and

Germany in }\.ugust 1924. Germany almost immediately turned
the corner to her recovery, slthough it

J,~
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slow. Yet it is eesenti'al to recognize that no country
through

~

period of prostration as complete

:ilS

p~ssed

thlOt of Ger-

many in 1923 and 1924. !lowhere was misery so general, n6where was suffer:ing so univeraal. "No proud people had ever
been forced to endure greater humil istion.

l~ot}jing

ph;;sicaJ or menb.l suffering lu.d been spared the

of

jnh~bitants

of the /reat cities. Nor is it an exaggeration to sa J that
the limit of humlOn endurlilnce l,ad been reached. Never was
a race between ultimate ruin and possible recovery more

closAly run. ilctually the slOlvation of the Daw0s llliln arrived
at the eleventh hour."*

* Ibid

pg. 299
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Chapter III
Loc1>rno
In Europe at this time there were two

~ajor

problems--

security and econorric revival. The Dawes Plan was
~hese pro~lems.

the second of

at

~jmed

The security problem remained

to be der.oJt 1;'dth. Fr:.nce demanded it. Germany, totally disarmed, needed it, having experienced the invasion of the
Ruhr and

t}ie

Rhine] and revolt.

Lea['ue an experiment and

F'r~nce

fc~red

cons ide red the -young

that it m' glit be too weak

to procure its ends. For t},is reflson sbe had gone her o'.vn
way by renewing the ver';/ sy st em, favored bef'ore 1914, of
su.rrounding Germany with a ring of iron.

,ith the adoption

'of the DSiOwes flan came tbe feeli.ng tt'at if a politicsl
agreement could be made with her ancient foe it would be a
more

eff~ctive

method of obtainjLg security than either

the League or the miJit&ry ring.
Germany, under the able le:i<dership of
abandoned her policy of'

bastern~Urientation

~.tref'emsnn,b

ad

gnd passive

resistence wben she real ized t.rlSt ber immediate problem
was to restore the independence of her people b-y obtsjning
the evacuation of ber national soil, the abolition of
financial control lilnd the return to the councils of Furope
on tbe footing of a great power.*
The first attempt at tbis

politic~l

Geneva Protocol. This protoGol was

Qgreement

cre~ted

WRS

the

as a result of

the P.sE;embly's requestthatthe Gouncil of the .L82fue of Nations
draw up a plan for lOn
would promise to give
~.!_
.....c:;,tresemlifnn

~

vre c'm8nt in '.'Jnich each st.ate

"imrnf)di~te

'"-nd efff;ctive" assist'"-nce

-...oddre1=!s
- to 7th ordinar v" session of the Assembly
of the League of Nations - Verbatim Record
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to the victim of liOn unprovoked lii.ttlii.ck. 'fhe first line of

tIlis trelii.ty decllii.red, IIAggressive 'Nlii.r is

~-n~nternlii.tionliOl

crime. 1I Tbe framers found it difficult to determine the
lii.ggressor in
th~t

Iii.

given

c~se,

~nd

the tre:.t-y simply provided

within four da-ys after hostilities break out the

Council should render

decision. Grelilt Britlii.in opposed it,

9

stressing that it forwarded the idelii. of force rather than
justice. Ramsey

MgcDon~ld,

British prime minister, present-

e4 his views of universal peace on the ;rounds thlilt security

could onl-y be attlii.ined by n9tions 9greeing to submit thetr
disputes to courts of llii.w ['nd to abide by the decision.
France disagreed, bringing out the point the pledged word
of nlii.tions

'.'1:;18

not enough. Theunis, the Belg:ipn prime minis-

t er, support ed the French by saying, "Gi ve us 9n ~. s sur~mce
of s9fety and we Belgians will gladly dismiss our soldiers,
but can you expect us to risk our security on 'i,'ords alone,
again Qnd so soon?"
Tr~

Geneva t'rotocCiJl

result~d

from the combined points

of fu9cDonald's arbritration Gnd rlerriot's security. By the
other .polnts of the Ilgre0ment the prjnciples of Disa.rmament
S~curity,

and Arbitration were 9ttempted to be r0lillizedin

a unified form. It

Wf,/S

undoubted]~·

plan ever djscussed • .1.t, however,

the most 9mbi tious pe:oce
f~lled

to galn accept{;lnce

because it 92ked more than the gre9t powers
concede. The British view

W&S

ere ready to

infJueDced by the fear thQt

it would endQnger tbe close co-operation between the British
Empire limd the United ':'tates thlii.t had l'een their m:dn-st:ilY
since tbe Great

~ar.

Germany was not

included since this
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was inter-:fjeague. This propos.l,

nevf~rtheJess,

had its

effect in the change of atmosphere that it brought over

Europe+.· The poisoned atmosphere of the 1914 perlhod had been
injected with a new spirit of conciliation.

*

Stresemann and Luther, the Chancellor of Germa.ny, set
out to sol ve the immediate problem of Germlmy as has been
given above. Their first move
Great Powers. A note to the

n

w~s

to neg.tiate with the

lied governments on February

9,1925, suggested that France, .ltSil1y, Germany,
Bri t a j n enter ". solemn obligation not to

and Great

v:~ge;'lar

IOlglOinst

each other; and tlH..t this bbligliltion sl10uld be liu"'siJ..med v:ith
~tates

the United

acting as trustee; also the recognization

by Germany of a stliltus quo on the western

bound~ry

bet'Vveen

Fr:mce IiInd herself. Tl-'is note immedilftely met with &pproval
in EngJand and from. t.he outset British supnort of the
Stresema.nn proposal W&s assured. The French voice was not
of whole-hearted
Germany

'.'HlS

approv~l

because the eastern boundlilry of

excluded. 'l'hus tbe eastern frontiers of GermQny

dominated all the discussion before the LocGrno Conference.
A change cGme, however, in U,e French policy by the return
of Briand to the quai d'Orsay. Briand and

Stresem~mn

con-

tinued the negotations where Herriot had left off and by
October everythjng Vias set for the Conference and it was
called lilt Locarno, Switzerland, Represent!iitives of Germany,
~rance,

and

Great Bri tlidn, Poland, Belgi1JlIl, Czecho-S1avlilkia,

It~ly

were present.

In two weeks the five Locarno Pacts WRre signed. Four
of the five treaties were no more thane greements between

*

"
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Germany on the one band litnd ber neighbors, Belgium, Frlitnce,
PoJ and,

ald Czecho-f:!lovlitkilit on the other, to submit 1it11

future issues to arbitrlittion.
Tte fifth document WIitS t:he
tinued

Germ~n

~:E'curi ty

plitct, ",hich con-

litnd French pledfes to litccept the

territori~l

stptus quo crelitted in the west b:,' the 'l'resty of Versailles,
and the Germlliiln promise to observe the condit iens 'Ni th respect
of the demilitlitrized zone cont:;tined in the

s~.me

cO:'Ypact.

Great Britain litnd Italy also joined in gUlitrlliilnteeing this
Eecurity Plliilct. Gc;rma;ny litnd Belgium, and Germ;;;.nJ and

Fr~nce

mutually litgreed not to litttack, invade, or resort to

~ar

Iit£:oinst elliilch otber. TIis Yrelitnt that Germany liibandon8d all
hope of

regaininf~

gave tLeir

Alsace-Lorrlliiline and th"t the great stgtes

gUliir~ntee

t.o the Rhinellliilnd

frontiHr.?~

Although from the technical standpoint the l'act is
full of loopholes, its signlficlitnce litrises out of the spirit
of coneD iation in wt j
tr~aties

dr:iifted. This

Cr-l

tbe conference vIas held and the

~as

import~nt

because; thls was the

first time that GRrTn:ony clitd been received in the council of
ngtions as :;In equal; it was the first time that; the pt&:tesmen of the vreat ststcs h:;;d:ork€',d together under conditjons
of peace; :md it

WIIiiIS

tree initial occasion'ihen the stlliiltes-

men of the severlitl countries worked togetherd. t:t the
sense, not of ending by compromise some specific dispute,
but of 1litying the foundations for a
pacification. '11he

lI~:pirjt

s~stem

of general

of Loclii.rnoll WIitS inHtituted gS

the perm:ment reconciJ ilitticm of France ;;;nd Germany. It
marked tbe end of the moral isol"tion of GermliOny. It

*
p
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witnessed the f1nal extinction of the spirit of
The

re~sons

uted to the

for the success of

negot~tions

Loc~rno

c~n

Vers~illes.

be

of Streseml>nn, Brhmd, lmd

attri~
Ch~mber

laln before the convokjng of t:be l-'liIct. iilhen the preliminary
agreement had been reached they went to
minor details

~nd

to sign.

Loc~rno

Loc~rno

to s8ttle

treated the world to

the welcome spectacle of French, Germlil.n,

~nd

British states-

men in agreement for the first tit'e sjnce the outbreak of
the Grelilt \j'iar. As

iii

result, there followed a period of

clillrn and reconstruction in Europe •

.
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